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ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the Bolivian Constitution’s framework
for human rights marks a fresh and novel development in Latin
American constitutional theory and practice, moving towards closer
compliance with internationally recognized human rights
standards. First, it discusses the features of the framework of
Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution for the recognition of human rights.
Second, it probes several key provisions in the new constitution
concerning the interpretation of rights that allow for the admission
of international human rights law into the domestic legal system.
Third, it explores the hierarchical status granted to international
human rights treaties at the domestic level and the keys to their
implementation. Fourth, on the basis of a discussion on the
configuration of the system of protection of rights in Bolivia, this
Article attempts to develop the implications of the Bolivian
Constitution for integration and respect for international human
rights law within the larger context of the Inter-American legal
system.
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INTRODUCTION

From 2005 to 2009, the South American nation of Bolivia
underwent the most profound political, legal, and constitutional
transformation in its history, and one of the most radical
transformations in Latin America in the past fifty years. Although
frequently overlooked by international relations specialists and
legal scholars, Bolivia is the fifth largest nation in South America and
has the largest proportion of indigenous peoples as a share of its
population among all countries in the Western hemisphere. 1 With
world-class deposits of lithium and the largest reserves of natural
gas in Latin America, second only to Venezuela, it is bound to play
an increasingly strategic role in the global economy.2 The country’s
new constitution, debated and drafted by a Constituent Assembly
from 2006-2009 through an extraordinary process of popular
participation and consultation and subsequently adopted in 2009,
marks a major departure from traditional Latin American
constitution-making.3 In particular, it creates a novel framework for
the incorporation of the norms of international human rights law
into the country’s legal system. In essence, the new constitution
invites and, in some cases, requires, the application of the norms of
international human rights law to amplify its own protections, and
even supersede them when the international norms offer a level of
protection more extensive than that offered by the norms in the
constitutional text itself. Bolivia’s constitution thus offers a rich new
paradigm and case study on both the evolution of Latin American
constitution-making in the direction of greater openness to
international human rights law and how domestic constitutional

1 Joseph Kiprop, The Largest Countries in South America, WORLDATLAS (Dec. 1,
2020),
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-largest-countries-in-southamerica.html [https://perma.cc/X3T2-DQHK]; Bolivia Country Profile, BBC (Nov.
12,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18727507
[https://perma.cc/CDF5-A2P5].
2
Rick Mills, Bolivia: Where Revolutionaries and Lithium Miners Go to Die,
MINING[DOT]COM
(Dec.
26,
2018,
10:05
AM),
http://www.mining.com/web/bolivia-revolutionaries-lithium-miners-go-die/
[https://perma.cc/J3BQ-45SK].
3 See Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, Bolivia’s New Constitution: Towards Participatory
Democracy and Political Pluralism?, 90 EUR. REV. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 3, 3-4,
7 (2011).
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norms can be structured to facilitate greater normative interaction
with the rules and institutions of international law.
The present Article addresses several issues. First, it discusses
the particular features in the new Bolivian constitution’s framework
that recognize human rights. Second, it probes several key
provisions in the new constitution that concern the interpretation of
rights that allow for the admission of international human rights law
into the domestic legal system. Third, it explores the hierarchical
status granted to international human rights treaties at the domestic
level and the keys to their implementation. Fourth, on the basis of a
discussion on the configuration of the system that protects rights in
Bolivia, this Article attempts to develop the implications of the
Bolivian Constitution for the integration of, and respect for,
international human rights law within the larger context of the InterAmerican legal system.
“The first of the great tasks that contemporary constitutions are
set to undertake is to make a distinction between law, as a rule
established by domestic legislators, and human rights, as absolute
claims with their own legally independent validity.”4 The main
consequence thereof is that human rights are no longer seen as being
at the disposal of a legislator and, therefore, cannot be restrained by
constitutional law or by any other type of norm, regardless of its
rank.5
The protection of rights was one major object of concern to the
Bolivian Constituent Assembly (2008-2009) during the process of
developing the new constitution of 2009.6 Under the previous
constitutional system, human rights protection had degenerated
into an inadequate body of laws, causing the then-existing
constitutional order to enjoy no popular support whatsoever. 7 The
4
GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, EL DERECHO DÚCTIL: LEY, DERECHOS, JUSTICIA 47
(Marina Gascón trans., Giulio Einaudi ed., 10th ed. 2011).
5 See generally JUAN ANTONIO CARRILLO SALCEDO, SOBERANÍA DE LOS ESTADOS Y
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORÁNEO (2d ed. 2001) (discussing
the idea that human rights are above both constitutional bodies and constituent
power).
6
See Alex van Schaick, Bolivia’s New Constitution, NACLA (Jan. 21, 2009),
https://nacla.org/news/bolivias-new-constitution
[https://perma.cc/EFU3CN9K].
7
See Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 3, at 7-8; Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh
& Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions
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years of 2002-2005 saw large-scale social unrest and massive popular
demonstrations by various social movements whose dissatisfaction
gave rise to the election of the country’s first indigenous leader, Evo
Morales, as President in 2005, and a subsequent new constitutional
project expected to provide better protection for oft-violated rights.
Attempts were made in the new constitution to protect human rights
through the effective recognition of internationally recognized
standards8 that would make it difficult for future Bolivian
governments to infringe on them.9 Thus began the process of
restructuring human rights in the newly reformed, and newly
named, Plurinational State of Bolivia.
As part of this process of structural reform of the entire Bolivian
State, cultural pluralism has become a fundamental value as well as
a protective stipulation attached to the different constitutional
principles in the new constitution.10 The literature on pluralism in
the new constitutional text,11 be it general or special, and
independent of the current literature on the protection of minorities,
fulfills the function that guarantees the constitution’s openness to
new rights, making it possible for the constitutional text to
strengthen its capacity to evolve.12 Bolivian constitutional evolution
Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 212 (2008) (explaining that to
the extent that international law binds States and limits the options of policymakers,
it can serve as a pre-commitment device, and that the ideal way of doing this is for
constitutional designers to incorporate specific policies and international
instruments into the constitutional text).
8
NORBERTO BOBBIO, EL TIEMPO DE LOS DERECHOS 14 (Rafael de Asís Roig trans.,
1991) (pointing out “the recognition of human rights is at the root of present-day
democratic Constitutions, and these rights must be recognized and protected by the
States and international systems alike”). Id.
9
See ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 4, at 47.
10 Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño, Dogmática de los Derechos Fundamentales y
Transformaciones del Sistema Constitucional, 20 TEORÍA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL
495, 499 (2007). “One of the most outstanding signs in the systems of protection of
fundamental rights in a constitutional democracy is certainly the shift from a ‘center
of gravity’ deeply rooted in Unitarianism to a pluralist conception.” Id.
11
See René Kuppe, Reflections on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the New
Venezuelan Constitution and the Establishment of a Participatory, Pluricultural and
Multiethnic Society, in 12 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY” INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK FOR
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 152 (René Kuppe & Richard Potz eds., 2005). “Latin
American countries . . . are composed of a large number of ethnic groups and
cultural traditions and[, consequently,] [e]ach individual legal system can develop
various responses to these pluralist realities.” Id.
12
See PETER HÄBERLE, EL ESTADO CONSTITUCIONAL 47 (Héctor Fix-Fierro trans.,
2003).
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in matters of human rights can be assessed on the basis of its various
clauses which guarantee the protection of rights from a pluralist
viewpoint.13
These clauses also make it possible to adopt
international standards as guides to domestic legislation.14
Another key issue addressed by the new constitution was the
creation of a basic structure for the protection of rights, as well as a
context for interpretive solutions to various problems that may arise
in cases where rights conflict with one another or where their
application and enforcement would create conflicts with other
constitutional norms.15 In this regard, the solutions that the
Plurinational Constitutional Court has been adopting throughout its
jurisprudential activity since 2009 on the basis of the new Bolivian
constitutional norms are particularly interesting for the defense of
rights and the observance of international standards of protection
and guarantee.16
II. RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The rearrangement of the system of protection of rights in the
new constitution required going beyond the traditional limitations
of the Bolivian constitutional tradition to make the new charter more
open and flexible. In this respect, it is appropriate to analyze the
13
See Peter Häberle, El Estado Constitucional Europeo, in LA
CONSTITUCIONALIZACIÓN DE EUROPA 31 (Miguel Carbonell & Pedro Salazar eds.,
2004) (stating that giving preference to its own identification elements is no longer
a valid argument to prevent a constitutional State’s opening to the international
community).
14 JAVIER GARCÍA ROCA, EL MARGEN DE APRECIACIÓN NACIONAL EN LA
INTERPRETACIÓN DEL CONVENIO EUROPEO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS: SOBERANÍA E
INTEGRACIÓN 37 (2010); see also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art.
179 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 2, 1967 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945 (Bol.) (demonstrating that the human rights covered
by constitutional declarations under external jurisdictional controls are very
important limitations to the exercise of power).
15
See KLAUS STERN, DERECHO DEL ESTADO DE LA REPÚBLICA FEDERAL ALEMANA
230 (1987).
16
Héctor Fix-Fierro & Sergio López Ayllón, El Impacto de la Globalización en la
Reforma del Estado y el Derecho en América Latina, in EL P APEL DEL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL EN AMÉRICA 315, 327-28 (1997) (warning that the “growing influence
of International law has gone beyond its supplementary and complementary
application and facilitated the recognition of its prevalence, which begins to be
obvious in the fields of international trade and human rights”).
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construction and treatment of human rights in the Bolivian system
in order to establish not only the extent of its evolution regarding
safeguards and guarantees, but also the structural keys of the
current catalogue of rights with a view to their interpretation and
implementation according to international standards. 17 Throughout
this first section we start by examining the elements that gave shape
to the catalogue of rights in constitutional texts prior to the 2009
constitution. Then we will discuss particular features of the new
Bolivian catalogue of rights and, particularly, the keys that play a
role in adjusting their content to that of the rights established in
recognizably valid international instruments. The importance of
this section lies in the fact that it is impossible to carry out a true
analysis of the characteristics and implications related to the
interpretation and hierarchy of such rights if the evolution,
possibilities and limitations of the current list of rights are not
properly known.
a. A Brief Overview of Bolivian Constitutional History
Before we address the constitutional changes related to the
protection and guarantee of rights in the Bolivian context, it is
essential to briefly go over their configuration in the country’s
constitutional history. This approach proves to be extremely useful
not only to verify the historical structure of constitutional rights and
their protection at the national level, but also to understand the way
in which they have been defended by international human rights
instruments and public authorities. We will start by examining the
framework of protection provided by Bolivian constitutions since
1826 and the content of the internal system before the enactment of
the constitution of 2009. Secondly, we will discuss the role played
by international instruments concerning the degree of protection of
these rights. Both elements are intended to provide a clearer picture
of the human rights situation in the Bolivian normative system
before the enactment of the constitutional text of 2009.
17
See Pérez Luño, supra note 10, at 502 (stating that “the guarantee of a
multiplicity of jurisdictional entities for an effective defense of fundamental rights
is another typical feature of present-day constitutionalism and that jurisdictional
opening correlates to the surpassing of the State’s field of reference, as results from
a system immersed into a new order of international relations”).
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Fundamental Rights

From 1825 onward, the fundamental problem of Bolivia’s
numerous constitutions was that the protection of rights was
completely inadequate for the indigenous population and the
overall impoverished masses, given its failure to recognize the
principle of equality.18 This fact, together with the guarantee of the
exercise of political rights only on the basis of the individual’s
citizenship—which was in turn subject to exclusionary
requirements related to economic and social status—strengthened
the idea of the existence of first-class Bolivians, as opposed to
second-class Bolivians who were at the service of the former’s
interests and had representation or protection.19 Power was
monopolized by an elite Spanish-based minority which guaranteed
inferior treatment to anyone who threatened to interfere with their
economic and class interests.20 Not only were colonial arguments
employed to deny indigenous peoples citizenship and even human
status; “the indigenous peoples were also put on a level with minors,
and under the permanent guardianship of a ‘boss’ who made all
decisions for them.”21
The evolution of human rights and of their recognition went
through a slow and painful process in the country’s history. The
Bolivian constitutions of 1826 and 1831 placed rights in their last
clauses,22 abiding by a criterion that gave preference to the State’s
18 See generally Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 3 (analyzing the need for the
establishment of a constituent assembly).
19 See LUIGI FERRAJOLI, DERECHOS Y GARANTÍAS: LA LEY DEL MÁS DÉBIL 127
(Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez & Andrea Greppi trans., 4th ed. 2004). Contrary to
expectations, the fundamental rights in the Bolivian Constitutions did not act as
limitations of correlative powers, nor used to defend the weakest subjects from the
principle of survival of the fittest.
20
Linda Farthing, Evo’s Bolivia: The Limits of Change, NEXT SYS. PROJECT (Aug.
7, 2017), https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/evos-bolivia-limits-change
[https://perma.cc/4ZED-D7KE].
21
Juan Carlos Pinto Quintanilla, Aportes a la reflexión política de la Constitución,
in BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO: CONCEPTOS ELEMENTALES
PARA SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 57 (2010).
22
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826, arts. 149-57 (Bol.);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1831 Aug. 14, 1831, arts. 149-65 (Bol.). See generally
Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño, Las Generaciones de Derechos Humanos, 10 REVISTA DEL
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 203 (1991) (explaining the succession of
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structure and powers over the protection of human rights. This
order of importance was not just formal in the constitutional text,
but also the reflection of a society that sought to preserve a given
order and set of privileges granted to a minority group to the
detriment of the national majority.23 These early constitutions laid
down a simple enunciation of rights which, though under the title
of “guarantees,” did not constitute in themselves a system capable
of providing adequate mechanisms of protection. On the contrary,
they revealed a total absence of measures underpinned by legal
guarantees.24 Furthermore, these rights could be revoked under the
terms and circumstances established by the constitution,25 which
represented an enormous limitation on their enjoyment. The
configuration of these constitutional texts supported and passively
tolerated situations of widespread systematic violence and
discrimination.26
Under the constitution of 1861,27 the public authorities could no
longer vest anyone with powers likely to place human rights at the
“generations” of fundamental rights and the transition from a State subject to the
rule of law to a “State of rights”). The late 19th century marked the beginning of a
modern age in the legal field, when laws took center stage in favor of individual
rights and gave rise to a generic agreement which praises the idea that rights and
freedoms are the true foundation of any State subject to the rule of law. Id. at 20304.
23
See Raúl Prada Alcoreza, Umbrales y horizontes de la descolonización, in EL
ESTADO. CAMPO DE LUCHA 43, 58 (2010).
24
See Pedro Cruz Villalón, Formación y Evolución de los Derechos Fundamentales,
25 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 35, 49-51 (1989) (asserting
France’s constitutions of the late 1700s did not adequately protect the fundamental
rights they claimed to guarantee because they did not set forth legal remedies for
violations of those rights). Cruz Villalón, following Adhémar Esmein, makes it
clear that the guarantee of rights are truly positive laws with a force of their own
and that protect individual rights from the legislators. Id. at 50-51.
25
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826, art. 157 (Bol.).
26
See Prada Alcoreza, supra note 23, at 58-59; see also Hervé Do Alto, “Cuando
el nacionalismo se pone el poncho”: Una mirada retrospectiva a la etnicidad y la clase en el
movimiento popular boliviano (1952-2007), in BOLIVIA: MEMORIA, INSURGENCIA Y
MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES 21, 23-24 (2007) (describing the way in which indigenous
Bolivians were stripped of their land and stigmatized with the label “indio” after
the State was established).
27
Professor Robert Alexy remarks that “fundamental rights play a twofold
role as components of a democratic process and as elements to engage legislators,
thus depriving a democratically-elected majority of any decision-making power.
Therefore, there cannot be unlimited confidence in a democratic legislator, since the
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mercy of either the government or another person,28 thus
introducing, for the first time, the significant criterion of “nondisposability” of rights in Bolivia.29 However, it was still possible to
suspend constitutional “guarantees”—rights—in cases of internal
insurrection,30 revealing that the enjoyment of rights was still subject
to public authorities.31 Moreover, the enjoyment and exercise of the
rights of the majorities32 was largely conditioned during the
constitutional period by extensive property-holding requirements
that in practice excluded citizenship.33 Between 1880 and 1951 the
number of people who had citizen status added up to only two to

majority principle stands as a permanent threat over minorities.” Robert Alexy, La
Institucionalización de los Derechos Humanos en el Estado Constitucional Democrático, 8
DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES: REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS 21, 40
(2000).
28
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 10 (Bol.).
29 See id. The French Constitution of 1791 was the first to introduce the “nondisposability” criterion by stating that legislative power could not make any laws
which infringed upon or obstructed the exercise of natural and civil rights.
Nonetheless, Pedro Cruz Villalón explains that the purpose of this article failed
insofar as no remedy was specified for the violation of rights by the legislators.
Cruz Villalón, supra note 24, at 51.
30
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 11 (Bol.).
31 See id. The disposability of rights in cases of war or insurrection facilitates
the violation of human rights, even in democracies otherwise deemed consolidated.
See generally Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (ordering
Japanese Americans into internment camps during World War II regardless of
whether they were American citizens, which amounted to a serious violation of
their rights); Korematsu vs. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ruling Exec. Order No.
9066 to be constitutional); Yasui vs. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (affirming the
conviction of appellant for violating the curfew issued by this Exec. Order);
Hirabayashi vs. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (affirming that prescribing this Exec.
Order was within the constitutional power of Congress and the Executive, and that
the Exec. Order did not unconstitutionally discriminate against people of Japanese
ancestry).
32
See HUASCAR SALAZAR LOHMAN, LA FORMACIÓN HISTÓRICA DEL MOVIMIENTO
INDÍGENA CAMPESINO BOLIVIANO. LOS VERICUETOS DE UNA CLASE CONSTRUIDA DESDE LA
ETNICIDAD 20-21 (2013) (ebook) (estimating that in 1826 Bolivia had a total of
1,100,000 inhabitants, of which 800,000 were indigenous Bolivians, with ninety
percent of them living in the countryside, especially in the Andean region).
33
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 13 (Bol.). “As a result,
women, the indigenous population, and peasants were not entitled to political and
judicial rights. In this context, the indigenous peoples were absolutely nonexistent,
deprived as they were of any civil and political rights.” See ÁLVARO GARCÍA LINERA,
LA POTENCIA PLEBEYA: ACCIÓN COLECTIVA E IDENTIDADES INDÍGENAS, OBRERAS Y
POPULARES EN BOLIVIA 177-78 (2d ed. 2009).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/2

2020]

The Role of International Human Rights Law

591

three percent of the overall Bolivian population.34 This unstable
situation left political decision-making power in the hands of a small
group of people, exerting a negative influence on the recognition of
the rights of the excluded population.35
All the same, the broadening of the catalogue of rights36 in the
1861 constitution was a positive achievement. The document made
it clear that those rights and guarantees it contained were not to be
understood as a negation of other, not specifically enumerated,
rights, as long as they were in keeping with the principle of popular
sovereignty and the republican form of government.37 In other
words, the constitutional catalogue was open rather than closed or
strictly narrow. But it was only with the constitution of 1945 that
mechanisms aimed specifically at the protection of rights38 became
noticeable for the first time, with the appearance of procedures to
request custody in cases of improper detention, prosecution or
imprisonment.39
The constitution of 1967 incorporated a number of rules that
made this text more progressive than the previous ones. For the first
time a clause was included which established the principle of

GARCÍA LINERA, supra note 33, at 275.
See, e.g., Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 3, at 16 (describing the discrepancy
between the strengthening of participatory democracy by the new Bolivian
Constitution and the actual socio-political context). Since the new country was
founded on theft and plundering, the indigenous nations were considered the main
obstacle, taking into account that they were the owners of the riches. Consequently,
they were the victims of a legal strategy of permanent aggression designed to
dominate or exterminate them. See Félix Cárdenas Aguilar, Mirando indio, in
BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO. CONCEPTOS ELEMENTALES PARA
SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 17, 22 (2010).
36
The first constitutional text to incorporate a provision stating the
observance of rights not specifically enumerated in the constitutional text was the
Constitution of the United States through the Ninth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. EDWARD CORWIN, LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS
UNIDOS Y SU SIGNIFICADO ACTUAL 587 (1987).
37
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 18 (Bol.).
38
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945, art. 8 (Bol.). Articles 1 to 19
of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23, 1949 established
in an exemplary manner what is known today as the law of fundamental rights:
general relationship, direct effectiveness, essential content and legal protection.
Cruz Villalón, supra note 24, at 62.
39
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945, art. 8 (Bol.).
34
35
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equality40 among Bolivians.41 Another clause recognized and
granted citizenship and political rights to all Bolivians of twenty-one
years of age, regardless of their educational level.42 Both provisions
granted the Bolivian indigenous nations, workers, and peasants the
right to participate for the first time as formal actors in the political
power structure. Moreover, the key legal concepts of habeas
corpus43 and constitutional protection,44 two important resources for
the protection and guarantee of constitutionally established rights,
were included, and they were to retain almost identical
characteristics in the subsequent constitutional reforms of 1994,
2004, and 2005.
It goes without saying that inequality was still rampant even
after these important legal principles were adopted 45 because, even
though the constitution established the right to non-discrimination,
the political system was still under the control of a Criollo-Mestizo
elite.46 All rights and guarantees notwithstanding, the public
authorities worked regularly in favor of this minority’s interests. At
the very basis of the State there was a built-in disregard for
indigenous identities and subjects, who were forced to live under an

40
See FRANCISCO RUBIO LLORENTE, LA FORMA DEL PODER (ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA
CONSTITUCIÓN) (1993) (on the concept of equality). Bear in mind that equality is a
relational concept and not a quality. At the same time, this relationship must have
some form of diversity resulting from an assessment of a plurality of elements. Id.
at 640.
41
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO 1967 Feb. 2, 1967, art. 6 (Bol.); see ALF
ROSS, SOBRE EL DERECHO Y LA JUSTICIA 278-79 (Eudeba 1963) (explaining that, in this
case, “the requirement of equality was qualified through a reference to specific
criteria that gave it a tangible meaning”).
42
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO 1967 Feb. 2, 1967, art. 41 (Bol.).
43 Id. art. 18.
44 Id. art. 19.
45
See LIBBET CRANDON-MALAMUD, FROM THE FAT OF OUR SOULS: SOCIAL
CHANGE, POLITICAL PROCESS, AND MEDICAL PLURALISM IN BOLIVIA 48-50 (1991)
(discussing that the “equality clause is infringed when the defeat of a legal decision
is the consequence of a special vulnerability to prejudice, hostility or stereotyping
and the subject’s situation is disparaged at the level of the community and that the
purpose of this clause is to guarantee equality of treatment during the political
process and deliberations”); see also RONALD DWORKIN, VIRTUD SOBERANA: LA TEORÍA
Y LA PRÁCTICA DE LA IGUALDAD 451 (2003) (discussing the equality principle).
46
CRANDON-MALAMUD, supra note 45, at 48-50.
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institutional system, a body of laws, and a prevailing discourse bent
on depriving them of their basic rights.47
To summarize, constitutional recognition and guarantees of
fundamental rights in Bolivia were largely characterized in practice
by discrimination against, and exclusion of, the national majorities.
The evolution of constitutional articles on these issues moved at a
slow pace and were characterized by three important phases. The
first of them took place between the enactment of the constitutional
texts of 1826 and 1945. It overlooked the protection of rights, laying
down instead strong restrictions on the enjoyment of civil and
political rights by the indigenous population.48 The second phase,
between the constitutions of l947 and 1961, introduced slight
variations which gradually reduced the requirements necessary for
persons to exercise and enjoy their rights.49 The third phase brought
with it the promulgation of the constitution of 1967—in force before
the constitution of 2009—and stipulated, for the first time, the
principle of equality and safeguards for the protection of rights.50
Even then, however, in view of the Bolivian social, economic and
political power structures, the infringement of rights remained a
commonplace practice.51

ii.

International Law

The violation of rights in Bolivia’s constitutional history was also
the result of a poor constitutional structure for the implementation
47
See generally LUIS TAPIA, POLÍTICA SALVAJE (2008) (discussing the systematic
discrimination of the indigenous people in Bolivia).
48
Angus McNelly, The Latest Turn of Bolivia’s Political Merry-Go-Round: The
Constitutional
Referendum,
VIEWPOINT
MAG.
(Feb.
18,
2016),
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2016/02/18/the-latest-turn-of-bolivias-politica
l-merry-go-round-the-constitutional-referendum/
[https://perma.cc/A3TNANBY].
49 Id.
50 Id.
51
See Dieter Grimm, Types of Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99, 124-25 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajó
eds., 2012) (discussing that a common problem of the constitutions was that, despite
the enumeration of equal rights, they were applied to unequal conditions, so,
consequently, this formal equality cemented the status quo).
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of international human rights law. There is no denying that the legal
loopholes in successive Bolivian constitutions—since the first
constitution of 1826 until the constitutional reform of 1967—
regarding the integration of international law into the national body
of laws made it impossible for the treaties on protection of human
rights to gain a real foothold in the Bolivian judicial culture, placing
them on a merely declarative level instead.52 As a result, most of the
international human rights treaties ratified by Bolivia failed to be
subsequently implemented, with an obviously negative impact on
their domestic observance and validity.53
Bolivia ratified a number of important international human
rights instruments between 1979 and 1982, at a time when the most
bloodthirsty dictatorships in its history ruled the country. For
example, Bolivia ratified the American Convention on Human
Rights on June 20, 1979, even as the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) received numerous communications
denouncing the violation of rights by Bolivian governments
between 1970 and 1982 —violations committed in most cases by the
ruling military juntas. From 1974 to 1982, the IACHR held the
Bolivian State responsible for cases of murder54 and illegal detention

52
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 2, 1967 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861
(Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826, art. 156 (Bol.) (demonstrating
a deficient structure that does not allow the defense of human rights through
international treaties).
53
ELIZABETH SANTALLA VARGAS, Bolivia, in PERSECUCIÒN PENAL NACIONAL DE
CRÍMENES INTERNACIONALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y ESPAÑA 83, 83 (Kai Ambos &
Ezequiel Malarino eds., 2003); COMISIÓN ANDINA DE JURISTAS, LA CORTE PENAL
INTERNACIONAL Y LOS PAISES ANDINOS 44-45 (2001).
54
Amalia Rada v. Bol., Case 1757, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.34, doc. 31 rev. 1 (1974); Benjamín Miguel Harb v. Bol., Case 1798,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.37, doc. 20 corr. 1 (1975); Artemio
Camargo v. Bol., Case 7739, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/81,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981); Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz v. Bol., Case
7458, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 27/81, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev.
1 (1981); Community of Caracoles v. Bol., Case 7481, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 30/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982).
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including torture55 and, in some cases, banishment.56 During all
those years, none of Bolivia’s governments in office cooperated with
the IACHR.57
Only on July 27, 199358 did Bolivia recognize the competence of
the IACHR,59 which on subsequent occasions condemned it and
55
Rubén Luis Romero Eguino v. Bol., Case 2720, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Nila Heredia Miranda v. Bol., Case 2721,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Maria Cristina
de Choque v. Bol., Case 2722, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev.
1 (1978); Nicanor Cuchallo Orellana v. Bol., Case 2723, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Abel Ayoroa Argondoña v. Bol., Case
2756, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Elsa
Burgoa v. Bol., Case 2757, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13
rev. 1 (1978); Sonia Flores v. Bol., Case 2758, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev.1 (1978); Edwin Antonio Guachalla Viana v. Bol.,
Case 2759, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Julio
Tumiri Javier v. Bol., Case 7472, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 28/81,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981); Flaviano Unzueta v. Bol., Case 7473, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 29/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982);
Guillermina Soria v. Bol., Case 7530, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 31/82,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982).
56
Ramon Claure Calvi v. Bol., Case 2719, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Vladimir Sattori Benquique v. Bol., Case
2760, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Juan
Antonio Solano v. Bol., Case 7823, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 32/82,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982); Diego Morales Barrera v. Bol., Case 7824,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 33/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1
(1982).
57
See cases cited supra notes 54-55.
58
Convencion Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San Jose),
Declaration of the Bolivian Government, OAS/MI/262/93, July 22, 1993 (declaring
at the time of deposit of the instrument of recognition of the competence of the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) in accordance with Article 62,
stating that “the precepts of unconditionality and an indefinite term shall be
applied in strict observance of the Political Constitution of the Bolivian State,
especially of the principles of reciprocity, non-retroactivity and judicial
autonomy”).
59
See, e.g., Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 4, ¶ 166 (July 29, 1988); Olmedo Bustos v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 87 (Feb. 5, 2001) (stating that this entails
the obligation to prevent, investigate, and punish any violation of the rights
recognized by the Convention and, if possible, restore the right violated and
provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation as
well as adjustment of its internal legislation to ensure the fulfillment of the said
obligations); see also Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 142 (Jan. 31, 2006) (emphasizing that
the obligation of guaranteeing the rights protected under the American Convention
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asked it to redress violations of rights.60 Only in 2005 did Bolivia
start to show its willingness to cooperate with the Inter-American
Court and the Inter-American Commission, as evidenced by its
signature on several agreements seeking a friendly solution in cases
of violation of rights, thereby acknowledging the truth of the
denounced violations and committing itself to measures of
compensation along terms agreed to with both victims and the
Court.61 Even then, however, not all of these cases (or at least not all
of those which, because of their nature, deserved to be submitted to
the Court once the State’s responsibility had been duly established)
have displayed the same conciliatory attitude on the part of the
government.62 Since 2009, the jurisprudential activity of the
Constitutional Court has gradually, albeit slowly, made some
progress regarding the recognition of the competence of the InterAmerican Court.63 The judgments issued by the Constitutional

on Human Rights is not exhausted by the existence of a normative body designed
to make the fulfillment of said obligation possible, but it demands conduct by the
government such that the real existence of effective guarantees is ensured with a
view to the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention).
60
Salmón v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 330 (Dec. 1, 2016); I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329 (Nov. 30, 2016);
Pachecho Tineo Family v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 272 (Nov. 25, 2013);
Cárdenas and Peña v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 217 (Sep. 1, 2010); Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 199 (Nov. 27, 2008); Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92 (Feb. 27, 2002).
61
Petition 241/04, Friendly Settlement: Malaga v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 98/05 (2005); Petition 14/04, Friendly Settlement: Bustos v.
Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 97/05 (2005); Petition 269-05, Friendly
Settlement: Osorio v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 82/07 (2007);
Petition 788-06, Friendly Settlement: Chávez v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report 70/07 (2007); MZ v. Bolivia, Case 12.350, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 103/14, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.153 (2014).
62
I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329 (Nov. 30, 2016); Pachecho Tineo Family v.
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 272 (Nov. 25, 2013); Cárdenas and Peña v.
Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 217 (Sep. 1,
2010); Ticona Estrada et al. v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 199 (Nov. 27, 2008).
63
Corte Constitucional, Nov. 12, 2001, Sentencia 1190/01-R (Bol.).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/2

2020]

The Role of International Human Rights Law

597

Court64 testify to the development of fundamental principles related
to due process based on the competence of the Inter-American Court
and show advances in the recognition of rights.65
Failure to comply with international human rights treaties on
account of their misinterpretation is not the only reason that human
rights have been so poorly protected in Bolivia.
Bolivia’s
membership in the World Bank and other international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund also have led
to the violation of the Bolivian population’s rights, as the
government has often overlooked people’s basic needs in its
eagerness to discharge its financial obligations to these international
bodies while carrying out restructuring programs.66 The social and
human rights costs of such programs have been much higher than
their proponents have admitted.
All the same, one of the main problems that Bolivian law faced
throughout the country’s constitutional history between the text of
1826 and that of 1967 was its minimal concern for the observance of
international human rights treaties at the domestic level, which
played a key role in preventing international human rights law from
being implemented in practice.67 Human rights were subject to
national standards of protection which proved insufficient to ensure
real protection and guarantee of the Bolivian population’s rights.68
64
Corte Constitucional, July 2, 2004, Sentencia 1020/2004-R (Bol.); Corte
Constitucional, Nov. 7, 2002, Sentencia 1364/2002 (Bol.); Corte Constitucional, Jan.
20, 2003, Sentencia 0004/2003 (Bol.); Corte Constitucional, Apr. 15, 2003, Sentencia
0491/2003 (Bol.); Corte Constitucional, Nov. 28, 2003, Setencia 1730/2003 (Bol.);
Corte Constitucional, Jan. 28, 2004, Setencia 0009/2004 (Bol.).
65
Diego García-Sayán, Justicia interamericana y tribunales nacionales, in
DIALOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS: ENTRE TRIBUNALES
CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES 805, 820-29 (2013).
66
Lizet Cossio Villarroel, La deuda externa y deuda ecológica, 25 Temas
Sociales
201,
201-03,
http://www.scielo.org.bo/pdf/rts/n25/n25a13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EF5-ZBE6]; CAPÍTULO BOLIVIANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS,
DEMOCRACIA Y DESARROLLO, INFORME ANDINO DE LA DEUDA. MIRADAS A LA DEUDA EN
LA REGION ANDINA 41 (2010).
67
See ANTÔNIO A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL SIGLO XXI 276 (2009) (explaining that “the ultimate
notions related to the protection of human rights go beyond the State law, which
turns the need for internationalization into a phenomenon agreed by consensus”).
68
See Aniza García Morales, La justiciabilidad como garantía de los derechos
sociales, in LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES COMO DERECHOS JUSTICIABLES: POTENCIALIDADES Y
LÍMITES 11 (Gerardo Pisarello ed., 2009) (arguing that “since in almost all countries
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Partly to remedy this existing state of affairs, the Bolivian
Constituent Assembly sought to change the situation by means of a
new constitutional text.
b. Catalogue of Rights
An examination of the Bolivian Constitution’s provisions
linking the constitutional text to international human rights law is
now appropriate. We draw particular attention to two features:
first, the extent to which these rights place limits on governmental
power; and second, the norms laying down positive actions and
proactive measures that the State is supposed to take to protect
human rights.69
i.

Rights

The fundamental rights promoted by the new Bolivian
Constitution are set out in the Second Chapter of Title II, called
“Fundamental Rights and Guarantees.”70 The enumeration of these

of the world the social state was not formed as a constitutional state but conceived
as a legislative and administrative state, people’s rights, and particularly their social
rights, were pushed into the background and became either principles of a political
nature or privileges solely granted to those who could access the formal labor
market”).
69
See Pierre Bon, La Protección Constitucional de los Derechos Fundamentales:
Aspectos de Derecho Comparado Europeo, REVISTA DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUCIONALES, Jan.—Apr. 1992, at 43, 43-44.
These two facets—the proclamation of rights and the establishment of
clauses that make it possible to guarantee their protection—represent the
twofold purpose that any constitution must serve in matters of protection
of human rights. The guarantee of these rights is precisely the most
controversial and essential function of a constitutional text.
Id.
See generally GREGORIO PECES-BARBA MARTÍNEZ, RAFAEL ASÍS ROIG & MARÍA
CARMEN BARRANCO AVILÉS, LECCIONES DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (2004)
(examining the origins, evolution, interpretation, and limits of fundamental rights).
70

DEL
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rights71 is presented in detail and focuses on elucidations of the
principles and actions the government must undertake to achieve
their realization.72 The structure of these fundamental rights rests
on the recognition of rights deemed essential to the development of
a life with dignity. Although some of these rights could be classified
as “basic,” and are not stipulated in much detail in other presentday constitutional texts around the world, they have been so
disregarded throughout Bolivian history that in the new
constitutional text they have become the State’s main point of
action.73
Subsequent chapters of the Bolivian constitutional text set out
further rights in detail. Among them we can find first-,74 second-75
71
See 2 ENCICLOPEDIA HISTÓRICA DOCUMENTAL DEL PROCESO CONSTITUYENTE
BOLIVIANO 2381-82 (Juan Carlos Pinto Quintanilla ed., 2012) [hereinafter
ENCICLOPEDIA HISTÓRICA] (explaining that even if the right to water is recognized as
a fundamental right, further on the constitutional text states that the right to water
is an “extremely fundamental”right); Nataly Viviana Vargas Gamboa, Los Derechos
Fundamentales en la Nueva Constitución del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: un análisis
indispensable del Derecho Al Agua, in LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS EN
LATINOAMÉRICA DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA. LOS CASOS DE BRASIL, BOLIVIA
Y CHILE 251 (2013) (discussing the right to water in Bolivia); Nataly Viviana Vargas
Gamboa, ¿Qué ha Pasado con el Agua en el Nuevo Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia?, 69
AMÉRICA LATINA HOY 95 (2015) (discussing how, with the inclusion of the right to
water, it can be said that the most emblematic of the fundamental rights has been
incorporated into the new Bolivian constitutional text); Pablo Iglesias Turrión &
Jesús Espasandín López, La Globalización y los Movimientos Sociales Bolivianos, in
BOLIVIA EN MOVIMIENTO: ACCIÓN COLECTIVA Y PODER POLÍTICO 29, 49 (2007).
72 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 15-20 (Bol.).
73
Cf. Ministerial Declaration of The Hague about Water Security in the 21st Century,
WORLD
WATER
F.
(2000),
https://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/world_water_council/documen
ts/world_water_forum_2/The_Hague_Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y52HJLCM] (including the right to water as a basic right, which had a long way to go
before it was recognized as a basic requirement for a dignified life).
74 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 21-29 [Civil and
Political Rights], 56-57 [Right to Property], 73-74 [Rights of Persons Deprived of
Liberty], 106-107 [Social Communication] (Bol.); see also Domingo García Belaunde,
El Estado Social Re-visitado, 15 PENSAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL 193, 197 (2011)
(pointing out that the fulfillment of first-generation rights is a relatively simple
process because they only request the State’s willingness to let, authorize or not
prevent something to be done).
75 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 35-45 [Right to
Health and Social Security], 46-55 [Right to Work and Employment], 58-61 [Rights
of Children, Adolescents and Youth], 62-66 [Rights of the Family], 67-69 [Rights of
Elderly Adults], 70-72 [Rights of Disabled Persons], 91-97 [Higher Education], 104-
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and third-76 generation rights77 which are now part of the longest
catalogue of rights that a Bolivian constitution has ever had.78
Significantly, these latter rights include specific clauses linked to the
enumeration of specific indigenous rights, complementing the
important indigenous symbolism found throughout the entire text.
The new rights stipulated in the text of the Bolivian Constitution
embrace, without a doubt, the “rights of the indigenous peoples,”79
also addressed more specifically in another clause related to the
rights of cultures80—every one of them focused on the recognition
and protection of the indigenous cultures. The incorporation of
these groups of rights into the Bolivian constitutional text is one of
the most important and significant measures to ensure the
recognition and protection of the rights of the greater part of the
country’s population. Such indigenous-related rights not only had
been left out of previous Bolivian constitutions, they were also
105 [Sports and Recreation] (Bol.); see also Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, La naturaleza como
persona: Pachamama y Gaia, in BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO:
CONCEPTOS ELEMENTARES PARA SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 109, 119-20 (2010).
As far as the configuration of environmental rights is concerned, while
they are referred to as social and economic rights, the text mentions other
living beings, which involves recognizing their rights as well. The
practical consequence of this fact is that any citizen will be entitled to
demand the protection of these rights in a court of law even if they are not
directly affected by their violation, since the legal personhood of the
Pachamama is recognized in its cultural dimension as Mother Earth.
Id.
76 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 30-32 [Rights of the
Nations and Rural Native Indigenous People], 33-34 [Right to the Environment], 35
[Right to Health and Social Security], 75-76 [Rights of Users and Consumers], 77-90
[Education], 98-102 [Cultures], 103 [Science, Technology and Research] (Bol.).
77
See García Belaunde, supra note 74, at 27 García Belaunde makes it clear that
“the division of human rights into generations is not due to priority considerations,
but simply that it was contingent on the specific moment in history where it took
place. In this connection, the division is merely chronological and neither good nor
bad, but simply an unquestionable and chronologically defined event.”
78
See LUIS MARÍA DÍEZ-PICAZO, SISTEMA DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 37-48
(2d ed. 2005) (describing the “inflation” of rights as a very serious problem, since,
for fundamental rights to be truly effective, there should probably not be too many
of them). The recognition of new rights is not a benign operation, but rather a task
that entails setting new limitations to the State’s performance and, therefore, also
symbolic ones, because the very idea of fundamental rights ends up damaged as a
result.
79
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 30-32 (Bol.).
80 Id. arts. 98-102.
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regularly violated regardless of their international protection. 81 In
fact, the inclusion of separate clusters of rights for the benefit of the
indigenous sectors—rights of the indigenous peoples and “the
rights of cultures”82—was one of the main grassroots demands that
came up during the Constituent Assembly.83 These sectors are
among the most vulnerable population groups in Bolivia’s
territory.84 Once the Assembly recognized their overall situation, it
took steps to protect their collective rights, all of them within the
bounds of the collective defense85 of these groups and their
identity.86

81
See Diego Moreno, El Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano, en la
Encrucijada: Cuatro tendencias y algunos desafíos para el futuro, in D ERECHOS HUMANOS
Y ORDEN CONSTITUCIONAL EN IBEROAMÉRICA 147, 153-54 (Juan Manuel López Ulla ed.,
2011).

Latin American constitutionalism recognizes the universal character of
human rights and the existence of vulnerable groups who have been
excluded and marginalized throughout history by incorporating a number
of rules designed to ensure the recognition of these groups’ specific needs
of protection, not only with non-discrimination guidelines but also with
specific provisions for affirmative action measures aligned with the
“pluralist” character of Latin American constitutionalism.
Id.
82
Latin American constitutionalism, described by Li-Ann Thio as illiberal, is
characterized by its failure to rely on individual rights, although it does resort to
separated powers to constrain public power, on the premise that the State is nonneutral and privileges “a substantive vision of the good, informed by ethnicity,
religion, or communal morality.” See Li-Ann Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal
Polities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133, 136
(Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajó eds., 2012).
83
ENCICLOPEDIA HISTÓRICA, supra note 71, at 129-31.
84
See generally Björn-Sören Gigler, Poverty, Inequality and Human Development
of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia (Geo. U. Ctr. for Latin Am. Stud., Working Paper No.
17,
2009),
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/CLAS%20RESEARCH/Working%20Papers/WP17.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5UY-9GNL] (examining the social and economic
difference between the indigenous and non-indigenous population, and analyzing
the underlying factors of the economic and social exclusion of these vulnerable
groups in Bolivia).
85
Although the communal ownership of rights entered the debate following
the recognition of second-generation rights, the most decisive contribution to the
recognition of communal ownership has been made by third-generation rights. See
Pérez Luño, supra note 22, at 216.
86
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 135-36 (Bol.).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2021

602

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:2

Since the goal of inclusion87 was the main purpose of recognizing
the rights of indigenous peoples and cultures, special attention was
paid to the distinct symbolism of these groups.88 The present
structure of rights enumerated in the constitution centers upon
fundamental rights, other clusters of rights, obligations and
jurisdictional guarantees, and actions of protection. 89 While the
structure of these rights responds to the classical one found in most
constitutional texts, one of its main features is the inclusion of a large
number of rights with strong cultural associations, accounting for a
very long list of them.90
Nevertheless, the recognition of these rights could create
boundary issues among the different clusters enumerated therein,91
since the wide range of the Bolivian catalogue of constitutional
rights also requires a similar level of protection and guarantee to all
rights.92 The degree of detail vested in constitutional rights may
87
See generally Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Oct. 21, 2011, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 1688/2011-R (Bol.) (describing the diversity and Action of
Liberty in Bolivia).
88
One of the most important elements of Latin American constitutionalism is
its social component as an imposition to and a need of regions having a high index
of social and economic inequality and extreme poverty, which brings with it a
diversity of profound implications for their political systems. See Moreno, supra
note 81, at 168-69.
89
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 125-27 [Action of
Liberty], arts. 128-29 [Action of Constitutional Protection], arts. 130-31 [Action of
Privacy Protection], arts. 132-33 [Action of Unconstitutionality], art 134 [Action of
Compliance], arts. 135-36 [Popular Action] (Bol.). As to the actions of protection
and guarantee of rights, their extension is also noticeable, at least regarding their
more specific classification. Id.
90
Moreno, supra note 81, at 153. “It is noticeable that the new Latin American
constitutions are usually characterized by the recognition of a wide and diverse
range of fundamental rights. There are several explanations for this, one of them
being the strengthening of the “social” nature of those Constitutions.” Id.
91
See generally Juan Irarrázabal Covarrubius, Book Review, 30 REVISTA
CHILENA DE DERECHO 201 (2003) (reviewing JUAN CIANCIARDO, EL CONFLICTIVISMO
EN LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (2003)) (detailing the difficulties courts face in
resolving conflicts).
92
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 109 (Bol.). The
considerable division and stipulation of rights in the Constitution—especially in
respect to the distinction between fundamental rights and other groups of rights—
turns out to be somewhat useless, since the Bolivian constitutional text establishes
that all rights are directly applicable and enjoy equal guarantees. Id. The division
also indicates that the classification of rights does not determine any hierarchy or
superiority of some rights over others. See id. art. 13. § III. Therefore, all the rights
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seem a little excessive because, instead of acting as a safeguard, the
details might become real obstacles to the rights’ implementation.
In such a case, the constitution requires a proportionality-based
interpretation capable of effectively protecting the different clusters
of rights.93
The very characteristics of the Bolivian system of rights give rise
to another major problem. The fact that these rights are laid down
in great detail, and that the specific characteristics of every single
cluster of rights are supposed to be protected, could lead to
interpretations intended to safeguard such characteristics at a
national level while disregarding the more universal interpretations
established by international law. In such cases, the interpreting
bodies are expected to carry out their task with due regard to the
fact that the universalization94 of rights is precisely one of the
elements that guarantee cultural pluralism95 at a national level.
Consequently, the more universal interpretations supplied by
international law are not at odds with a domestic legal interpretation
based on multiculturalism.
ii.

Obligations of the State

Throughout Latin America, human
increasingly stronger, at least formally if
revealing both negative dimensions of
dimensions of applicability.96 In other

rights are becoming
not in actual practice,
freedom and positive
words, human rights

enunciated in the Bolivian catalogue are considered to be fundamental, according
to the constitutional text itself.
93
See CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO, EL PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 103 (3d ed. 2007); see also MIGUEL CARBONELL, EL
PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD EN EL ESTADO CONSTITUCIONAL (2007).
94
Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño insists that in the case of third-generation
rights, the universal character is no longer an ideal postulate, becoming instead a
practical necessity. Pérez Luño, supra note 22, at 216.
95
FERRAJOLI, supra note 19, at 126-27 (remarking that “the constitutional and
universal nature of these rights is the main guarantee of multiculturality”).
96
MAURIZIO FIORAVANTI, LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: APUNTES DE
HISTORIA DE LAS CONSTITUCIONES 131 (G. Giappichelli, ed., Manuel Martínez Neira,
Trans., 1996) (“These duties go beyond the simple defense and guarantee of the
fundamental rights and freedoms, since the doctrine of modern-day
constitutionality can no longer be just a guarantee of restrained governance, as it
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generate positive as well as negative obligations. This tendency
seeks to attain a top level of protection for human rights that will
align with different actions of the State in order to ensure at least
minimum levels of fulfillment. These obligations are binding on the
State, and they prevail over both public authorities and any private
individuals in a position to violate any right. 97
It is safe to say then that the constitution is not just limited to the
enunciation of rights in the constitutional text: its articles also
establish norms of guarantee that entail specific obligations on the
State that are highly significant for their observance.98 These
provisions stipulate parameters of State performance in the
subsequent regulation of any aspect linked with human rights, as
well as in the design and implementation of related public policies.
In this respect, such obligations are exercised primarily in relation
to the rights enunciated in the new Bolivian constitutional text.
While it is understood that human rights are potentially capable
of imposing additional obligations on the State beyond the logical
assumption—consistent with each of these rights—of the State’s
duty to take all necessary measures to facilitate the exercise by
citizens of their rights, the enunciation of specific actions is one of
the most interesting elements incorporated into the new
constitution.99 Just as the actions undertaken by the State are
enforceable and considered constitutional parameters, so are the

should represent the doctrine of government obligations.”); see also FERRAJOLI, supra
note 19.
97
See Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, Séptima Conferencia
Sudamericana Sobre Migraciones: “Los Estándares Internacionales en Materia de
Derechos
Humanos
y
Políticas
Migratorias”
3
(2007),
https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2007/5577.pdf?view
[https://perma.cc/SUJ2-Y7E2] (claiming that human rights are understood as a
program capable of guiding a State’s public policies and contributing to democratic
institutionalization).
98
See JAVIER JIMÉNEZ CAMPO, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: CONCEPTO Y
GARANTÍAS (1999) (providing the definition and guarantee of fundamental rights);
see also P. Cruz Villalón, Derechos Fundamentales, in TEMAS BÁSICOS DE DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL 108, 108-09 (Manuel Aragón Reyes ed., 2001) (describing the
character, evolution, and identity of fundamental rights provided in the
Constitution).
99
Oscar Vega Camacho, Estado Plurinacional: Elementos para el debate, in
DESCOLINIZACIÓN EN BOLIVIA: CUATRO EJES PARA COMPRENDER EL CAMBIO 109, 126-27
(2011).
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rights of citizens.100 The demand of respect for human rights
established in the constitution involves a requirement for the State
to implement actions necessary for such purposes.101
The constitutional recognition of social and group rights as
complex structures requires public authorities to act upon these
rights by taking positive actions, that is to say, carrying out specific
functions as well as negative actions or abstention. 102 However, the
constitution has opted for a solution likely to overburden
constitutional rights, in the sense that its articles assign a high
number of actions to the Bolivian State that it cannot possibly fulfill
nowadays.103 Nevertheless, what the constitution stipulates should
be understood only as a parameter to be achieved, that is, as the level
of performance expected from the State for an effective observance
of the rights enumerated in the constitutional text. 104 Although the
100
Rebeca E. Delgado Burgoa, Algunas reflexiones sobre la Constitución Política
del Estado, in BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO: CONCEPTOS
ELEMENTALES PARA SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 39, 47-48 (2010). No special or
interpretative laws or regulations are necessary for a large number of the rights
established in the Constitution. Id. However, the delimitation of these rights is
undeniably necessary and it must be done on the basis of either the rulings made
by the Plurinational Constitutional Court or, as applicable in this case, specific
standards, since the degree of detail in their enunciation requires judicial precision.
Id.
101
In this way, an important problem arises that is not intended to be
addressed in this Article but is no doubt worthy of mention: how to make
jurisdictional demands about certain rights which depend neither on the parties nor
the judges, but on the State or the community as a whole. See García Belaunde,
supra note 74, at 27-29.
102
Ricardo García Manrique, Presentación, in DERECHOS SOCIALES Y
PONDERACIÓN 13, 29-30 (2d ed. 2009).
103
For a discussion on the lack of economic resources as justification for the
failure to protect human rights, see Alonso Manuel Chacón Mata, Derechos
económicos, sociales y culturales: Indicadores y justiciabilidad, in CUADERNOS DEUSTO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 51 (2007).
104
Id. Chacón Mata remarks that the doctrine has repeatedly referred to
economic, social, and collective rights as being subjective rights, thus giving the
State the expectation of ownership of all the resources needed for development. Id.
The power to demand their enforcement from the State turns into guidelines,
projects or programs that the citizens hope to have with State support rather than
into subjective rights with specific content that the State is compelled to protect. Id.
at 35. On the other hand, Norberto Bobbio points out, in regard to social rights, that
“it is mostly about expressing an aspiration to have future legislation which sets
limits for the defense of the relevant rights, making a distinction between their
proclamation and their effective fulfillment.” BOBBIO, supra note 8, at 21-22. Their
great practical function is to give impetus to the claims of movements that demand
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actions formulated by the State for the protection of rights may not
be immediately enforceable in the desired degree of detail, they still
dictate what the State should accomplish—or attempt to
accomplish—with a view to their future fulfillment.105 Meanwhile,
the minimum standards laid down by international instruments are
fully enforceable.
Although the Bolivian Constitution specifies rights in detail, a
number of leading legal scholars favor interpreting the
constitutional precepts to focus on achieving their minimum or
essential content,106 leaving to the legislature the task of developing
them more specifically. This course of action would open up space
for legislators to seek guidance from international law standards
and establish legal foundations empowering “rights-owners” to file
claims in cases of violation.107 Ultimately, of course, the key to
interpreting the State’s positive actions and their enforceability are
to be found in international human rights bodies, a fact anticipated
by the Inter-American human rights system, whose main challenge
has been to guide State actions through standards and principles
that establish the scope of rights108 and the processes for formulating
public policies effectively based on minimum standards.109 In the
case of Bolivia, the Inter-American system has provided the State
for them and the rest of people that their new material and spiritual needs be met.
The constitutional courts of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, as well as the Supreme
Court, and the courts of Argentina and Chile, respectively, have gradually
incorporated IACHR jurisprudence in what has been called a process of
nationalization of international human rights law. Id.
105
See LUIGI FERRAJOLI, JOSÉ-JUAN MORESO, MANUEL ATIENZA, GERARDO
PISARELLO, & RICARDO GARCÍA MANRIQUE, LA TEORÍA DEL DERECHO EN EL PARADIGMA
CONSTITUCIONAL (2d ed. 2009) (discussing rights and their interpretation and
guarantee).
106
See Chacón Mata, supra note 103, at 31 (discussing the minimum content of
economic, social, and cultural rights).
107
For an examination of Latin American constitutional norms since the
adoption of the most recent Colombian Constitution, see García Morales, supra note
68, at 16.
108
See generally García-Sayán, supra note 65 (supporting that the constitutional
courts of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, as well as the Supreme Court and the courts
of Argentina and Chile, respectively, have gradually incorporated IACHR
jurisprudence in what has been called a process of nationalization of international
human rights law).
109
Víctor Abramovich, Los Estándares Interamericanos de Derechos Humanos
como Marco para la Formulación y el Control de las Políticas Sociales, 2 ANUARIO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 13, 19 (2006).
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with valuable guidelines for the protection of human rights and
constitutional obligations.
Thus, in accordance with its immediate-effect generic
obligations, the State ensures that the laws are neither
discriminatory nor exclusive, and that they are designed to diminish
inequality among the most disadvantaged sectors. 110 Similarly, the
State shall implement measures for a progressive advance towards
the provision of adequate levels of protection that makes rights fully
efficient.111 At the same time, the State shall meet the minimum
needs of each right established in international instruments 112 by
making prioritized use of all available resources, as long as its
actions do not entail a regression from the levels of satisfaction and
guarantee already attained. In this regard, care should be taken to
ensure that human rights legislation always represents an
advancement, never a throwback, from current levels of protection
and guarantee.113

III. INTERPRETATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW
The new process of organizing the system of rights in the
Bolivian constitutional text had to deal with a number of major
issues. The main one was the creation of a system capable of giving
a new turn to the protection of rights and, at the same time, putting
an end to a long history of exclusion and discrimination against the
poor, indigenous, and peasant sectors of society. The constituent
assembly addressed this difficult challenge by means of different
strategies, including the extension of the catalogue of constitutional
rights, enactment of clear and detailed State obligations, and
improvement of the mechanisms to guarantee their observance.
110
GREGORIO PECES-BARBA, REFLEXIONES SOBRE LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES 92 (2d
ed. 2009).
111
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 8, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0292/2012-R (Bol.) (stating that
the Plurinational
Constitutional Court has accepted the obligation to pay special attention to the
party that, compared to the other, is at a disadvantage).
112 See García Morales, supra note 68, at 26.
113 See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 20, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 1513/2011-R, at 7 (Bol.).
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Nevertheless, in light of Bolivia’s historic systematic violation of
human rights, the constituent assembly realized the need to do more
about human rights protection and, therefore, clarify the keys to
their interpretation. In the following section we discuss, first, the
clauses that make it possible to extend the catalogue of rights to the
inclusion of aspects that were yet to be enumerated in the
constitutional text but already addressed in the international
system. Second, we discuss the solutions that made it possible to
enrich and expand the catalogue on the basis of the contents and
standards of those rights already provided for in international
human rights treaties.114 Third, we address the subsequent
decisions of the Constitutional Court about these issues.
a. Interpretation of Constitutional Rights
In the course of its work to provide the best possible protection
of rights, the Bolivian Constituent Assembly understood that all
constitutional rights must be capable of going beyond the “barrier”
of national protection and be interpreted in accordance with
international human rights law.115 This interpretation proves to be
all the more necessary when it comes to the extension of the Bolivian
catalogue of human rights, which lends itself to tensions and
contradictions among different rights, and requires the definition of
clear standards of fulfillment. It is important now to examine both
the keys allowing for an open catalogue of human rights, and the
solutions found by the constituent assembly for the interpretation of
constitutional rights on the basis of the content and standards laid
down in international human rights treaties.

114
At the regional level we have seen the emergence of a common human
rights law capable of providing minimally uniform answers to the problems that
occur in practice. See DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 34-35.
115
BOBBIO, supra note 8, at 68. Bobbio points out that “the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights originated with a dialectical movement that came into
being with the abstract universality of natural rights, went through specific
characteristics of national positive rights, and ended up in a concrete, rather than
abstract, universality of positive rights.” Id.
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The Open Clause

Article 13.II of Bolivia’s constitution states: “The rights declared
in the Constitution shall not be understood to deny other rights
hitherto left unmentioned.”116 This is an “open clause” aimed at
protecting rights not specifically included in the constitutional
text.117 While this “open clause” was present in the previous
constitution and thus was part of Bolivian constitutional law prior
to 2009, its discussion is important as part of an evaluation of the
newer constitutional provisions dealing with human rights and
international law.
The “open-clause” technique has been commonplace in Latin
American constitutions, albeit in very few instances without any
conditioning elements, as is the case in Bolivia.118 It is important to
clarify that in most cases this clause is included with conditions.
Nonetheless, interpretive bodies, such as courts, that may seek to
place limits on new rights, can be in a position to accept certain
rights based on previous court decisions (of either national or
foreign tribunals within a regional legal system such as the InterAmerican human rights system), and thus update the meaning and
scope of the constitutional text.
The “open clause” makes it possible for a number of rights
inherent to human personality and deprived of extended protection,
including those contained in international human rights treaties,119
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.II (Bol.).
Pérez Luño, supra note 22, at 217 (“The catalogue of rights can never be a
closed and finished work, since a democratic society must always be open to the
emergence of new needs which make it possible to establish new rights.”).
118 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA Aug., 2002,
art. 44; CONSTITUCIÓN DEL PARAGUAY June 20, 1992, art. 45; CONSTITUTION OF THE
ARGENTINE NATION May 1, 1853, § 33; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE
COSTA RICA Nov. 7, 1949, tit. V, art. 74; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1982, Jan. 20, 1982,
art. 63 (Hon.); POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU Dec. 29, 1993, art. 3; CONSTITUCION
DE LA REPUBLICA Nov. 27, 1966, sec. I, art. 73 (Uru.).
Noticeable in these
constitutional articles is the fact that, unlike the case of the Bolivian constitutional
text, the open clause is contingent on the fulfillment of certain parameters related
to the acceptance of a new law by the internal system which can be considered to
be even more restrictive when it comes to the protection of new rights.
119
The interpretation of the open clause of the Constitution of Panama made
by the Supreme Court of Justice extended constitutional guarantees to the rights
recognized in international instruments. Salvador Sánchez González, El Derecho
116
117
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to be considered as fundamental rights in various regional systems,
thereby making room for the incorporation of international human
rights treaties into domestic legislation.120 It must be underscored,
however, that in many judicial decisions affirming the recognition
of international human rights law through the “open clause”121 we
sometimes find reference to the direct incorporation of international
human rights treaties.122
In the Bolivian case, this formula paves the way for the
construction of solutions for situations in which the status of rights
not enunciated in the constitutional text is not entirely clear, as in
the case of norms not stated in the constitution but enunciated in
non-ratified international texts or adopted from customary
international law. In other words, the “open clause” enables these
rights to be recognized, fully incorporated into the Bolivian
catalogue of rights, and even granted constitutional rank, ensuring
their protection through the various “Actions of Protection”
specified in the constitution.123
It must be noted that the status of customary international law
in domestic legislation is not expressly addressed in the new
Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y la Constitución Panameña, 20 REVISTA
PANAMEÑA DE POLÍTICA 115, 118-19 (2015).
120
Allan R. Brewer-Carías, La aplicación de los tratados internacionales sobre
derechos humanos en el orden interno de los países de América Latina, 46 REVISTA
IBEROAMERICANA DE DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL 219 (2006),
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/R22024.pdf [https://perma.cc/A644-8AVW].
121
CAROLINA LEÓN BASTOS, LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES SEGÚN LOS TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS:
UN ESTUDIO DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA EN ESPAÑA Y COSTA RICA 48 (2010) (“While most
fundamental rights are enumerated in national constitutions, any right not
specifically included in the constitutional text shall be linked to the constitution on
the basis of international treaties, either in a horizontal relation or one directly
below in order of importance. Therefore, we can see that the rights do not
necessarily have to be stated in a constitution to be considered as fundamental
rights and granted the same guarantees as those already stated, because they can
also reach constitutional status through the International Treaties ratified by the
States.”).
122
See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN DE 2008 Oct. 20, 2008, tit. VIII, ch. 2, art. 417
(Ecuador); CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA Dec. 1999, art.
22; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] July 4, 1991, art. 94.
123
Néstor Pedro Sagüés, Los tribunales constitucionales como agentes de cambios
sociales, 17 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 527, 534-35
(2011) (describing the open clause as an ideal instrument to carry out social change
on the basis of constitutional competence and from which rights discovered and
declared by constitutional judges have emerged).
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Bolivian constitutional text.124
However, its enforcement is
understood as a non-written rule.125 On the other hand, the
comprehensive analysis of international law by the Bolivian
constituent assembly was truly commendable. The discussions
revolved around general international legal norms rather than
ratified international human rights treaties, but with the clear
intention to make as much open room as possible for international
human rights law.126 In this way, by means of a comprehensive
interpretation of the Bolivian constitutional text, and on the basis of
respect for the constituent assembly’s will, the “open clause” can
contribute to welcoming into the Bolivian legal system broader
rights already recognized in non-formal international human rights
instruments.
124
In the case of the United States, customary international law is not
explicitly included in the supremacy clause, but the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly indicated that customary international law is to be treated as federal law
and therefore constitutes the law of the land. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 714-25 (2004); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Filártiga v. PeñaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964) (holding that as international law does not prescribe use of the
doctrine, the Act of State doctrine shall be applied even if it is claimed to be in
violation of international law). But see Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938) (holding that the interpretations of the federal courts regarding customary
law are not binding on the States, but also that these courts are compelled to follow
decisions by the State courts if the State system decides to recognize the standards
of customary law); but see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law,
Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International
Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L LAW 91, 92-93 (2004) (providing a detailed analysis of the
applicability of customary law in the U.S. system).
125
ARACELI MANGAS MARTÍN, CUESTIONES PRACTICAS DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO Y COOPERACION JURIDICA INTERNACIONAL 516 (1994).
Mangas Martín points out that

there is an implicit rule in the constitution demanding that minimum
standards of international law be respected, since the existence of such an
implicit regulation of automatic adoption is accepted in the absence of a
standard stating otherwise. Id. Moreover, the rule is based precisely on
international legal codes, not on the national one.
Id. The doctrine of international law has understood that, given the absence of
formal reception by general international law, an implicit rule for the automatic
adoption of customary standards into the national legislation is embraced. MANUEL
DÍEZ DE VELASCO VALLEJO, INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 21920 (16th ed. 2007).
126
See generally Pinto Quintanilla, supra note 21 (analyzing the normative
development of rights, liberties, and powers involved in the adoption of Bolivia’s
constitution).
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While most of the currently recognized human rights can be
found either explicitly or implied as part of another specific right
enumerated in the constitution, the Bolivian catalogue of rights is far
from infallible or a finished product.127 For the most part, human
rights have been created through the course of history, gradually
born under certain circumstances, and they have stemmed from an
evolutionary process that has become one of the main indicators of
historical progress.128 Considering that new rights will likely be
established as time goes by, the “open clause” is a remarkable tool
to update the Bolivian catalogue of rights.
The extension of rights and the recognition of international
sources prove to be essential to the interpretive work of the
Constitutional Court, because the “open clause” contributes to
keeping the catalogue of rights always open to the inclusion of new
rights already stipulated in international instruments but yet to be
incorporated into the catalogue of Bolivian fundamental rights.
Starting from this premise, not only international human rights
treaties, but also the norms arising from international judicial bodies
and many other ordinary international norms are applicable, even if
they were not considered binding at the constitution’s inception.129
The placement of the “open clause” in the new constitutional text
was the outcome of the constituent assembly’s realization that the
catalogue of rights is essentially incomplete due to historical
limitations on both the constituent process and the international
instruments.130 The clause ensures permanent qualification and
ongoing development of human rights, as it automatically
127
See BOBBIO supra note 8, at 71 (remarking that “we do not need to let our
imagination run wild to foresee that technological progress, improved knowledge,
and the development of mass media will bring about sufficient changes in people’s
lives and social relations to create new needs and, consequently, new demands for
more freedoms and powers”).
128
Id. at 14-19. In this respect, Bobbio highlights that “human rights are one
of the main indicators of historical progress, the same rights which are gradually
‘born’ under certain circumstances marked by the defense of new freedoms against
old powers.” Id.
129
JOSÉ JOAQUIM GOMES CANOTILHO & VITAL MOREIRA, FUNDAMENTOS DA
CONSTITUIÇÃO 116 (1991).
130
Following Peter Häberle’s analysis, this clause, given Bolivia’s broad
catalogue, could even be referred to as an “empathy clause of human rights.” Peter
Häberle, Elementos Teóricos de un Modelo General de Recepción Jurídica, in DERECHOS
HUMANOS Y CONSTITUCIONALISMO ANTE EL TERCER MILENIO 151, 151-86 (Antonio
Pérez Luño ed., 1996).
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incorporates into positive constitutional law values and ideas from
ethics, politics and legal rights that are intrinsic to the concept of
human dignity and the essence of what it is to be a human being.
This amounts to a recognition that no right has to be recognized in
the constitutional text, or even in ratified international treaties, to
have constitutional rank, and that a new right can be included in the
category of fundamental rights.131
ii.

Article 13.IV «in fine»

Article 13.IV in fine of the constitution states: “The rights and
obligations enshrined in this Constitution shall be interpreted in
accordance with the international human rights Treaties ratified by
Bolivia.”132 One of the greatest concerns about the protection of
human rights is how to establish normative frameworks that are
sufficiently strong to allow for such protection as effectively as
possible. As stated earlier, in order to be entirely protected, these
rights need to be efficiently extrapolated to international law.133 The
new Bolivian constitutional text establishes an unprecedented
clause that makes it possible to interpret constitutional rights from
the standpoint of international human rights law.134 Given the lack
131
MANUEL BARRETO & LIBARDO SARMIENTO, DE LOS DERECHOS, LAS GARANTÍAS
Y LOS DEBERES 442-44 (Carlos Marín ed., 1997). For examples of the incorporation of

rights through the interpretation of Article 94 of the Political Constitution of
Colombia, see Corte Constitucional, Jan. 31, 1994, Sentencia T-028/94, Gaceta de la
Corte Constitucional (Colom.); Corte Constitucional, Dec. 15, 1993, Sentencia T594/93 Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional (Colom.); Corte Constitucional, June 24,
1992, Sentencia T-426/92 (Colom.); Corte Constitucional, Feb. 6, 1995, Sentencia T032/95 Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional (Colom.).
132
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.).
133
In the words of Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz, “the contemporary constitutional
State subject to the rule of Law can only be understood as being internationally
situated and, for the same reason, limited from the same viewpoint.” ALEJANDRO
SAIZ ARNAIZ, LA APERTURA CONSTITUCIONAL AL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y EUROPEO
DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS. EL ARTÍCULO 10.2 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA 44
(1999).
134
The role played by domestic courts within the international system does
not depend only on international legislation. SHARON WEILL, THE ROLE OF
NATIONAL COURTS IN APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 7-8 (André
Nollkaemper & August Reinisch eds., 2014). In fact, the activity of such courts
depends, above all else, on the nationwide empowerment of the domestic courts to
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of constitutional protection of human rights throughout Bolivia’s
history, the inclusion of such a clause proves to be essential to give
these rights effective support. 135 Obviously, in this respect, the
Bolivian catalogue of rights is thus made easier to interpret in a
much more effective way and endowed with a greater degree of
interpretative breadth and openness.136 Thanks to this rule, Bolivian
constitutional rights have found a timely window to usher in
international human rights law to enrich their content.
The insertion of this clause into the Bolivian constitutional text
has quite a few consequences, since it leads the State to put aside its
omnipotent role and allow the incorporation of international law
through constitutional interpretation by the judicial branch.137
Bolivian constitutional regulations about matters of human rights
have brought about a positive and expected change concerning the
interpretation of constitutional rights—the recognition by domestic
courts of international sources of human rights is a constant feature
apply international law through the appropriation of international obligations. Id.
These domestic courts shall ensure that both national legislation and State policies
fulfill their international obligations. Id.
135
The Portuguese Constitution of 1976 includes in Article 16.1 a precedent of
the constitutional rule of international openness in matters of human rights. See
DECRETO DE APROVAÇÃO DA CONSTITUIÇÃO Apr. 10, 1976, art. 16.1 (Port.). This article
contains no reference whatsoever to the fact that the applicable international
standards must necessarily be based on instruments ratified by Portugal. See id. It
thus establishes that the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution do not
exclude any other applicable group of laws or provisions stipulated by
international law. GOMES CANOTILHO & MOREIRA, supra note 129, at 115.
136
Araceli Mangas Martín stresses that
well-known universal international covenants such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are likely
to shed very little light on the interpretation of incidental obscurities found
in constitutional rights on account of their too general nature and
vagueness.
Araceli Mangas Martín, Cuestiones de Derecho internacional público en la Constitución
española de 1978, 61 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD
COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 143, 151–52 (1980). Nevertheless, he explains that “there
are plenty of hardly ambiguous covenants, some of them with a praiseworthy
degree of precision regarding the content of the rights regulated therein, which play
a decisive role when it comes to the interpretation of rights.” Id.
137
Matthias Herdegen, La internacionalización del orden constitucional, 16
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 71, 73 (2010). The
tensions related to international norms and the internal legal code can be better
addressed when there is a Constitution with a flexible interpretation capable of
endowing the local system of laws with permeability. Id.
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in international constitutional development. 138 Article 13.IV in fine
has the highest relevance in the context of the Bolivian constitutional
system. This clause stamps the entire constitutional system with an
exceptional capacity to respond to international human rights law,139
offering it a position of influence over the entire judicial system.140
The Bolivian Constitution only makes reference to international
human rights treaties, so Article 13.IV in fine would seem to overlook
the interpretative relevance of general or customary international
law—although, as we have seen, this problem can be solved at least
partially by resort to the “open clause” discussed earlier. We also
must bear in mind that domestic judges enjoy a great margin of
appreciation when it comes to the interpretation of customary
law.141 While some human rights-related rules are deemed jus

138
SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 87. In the case of Spain, the clause of
openness to international human rights law is contained in Article 10.2 of the
Spanish Constitution. LORENZO MARTÍN-RETORTILLO BAQUER, LOS DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES Y LA CONSTITUCIÓN: Y OTROS ESTUDIOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS 72
(2009). By its interpretation, this clause refers to the fundamental rights included
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, by its general formulation, to
the International Human Rights Treaties ratified by Spain. Id. The commitment to
take into account the Universal Declaration when it comes to channeling the
interpretation of fundamental rights and freedoms has found significant echo in
Spanish constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., JULIO DIEGO GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS,
ALGUNAS REFERENCIAS A LA COSTUMBRE Y LOS TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES EN LA
JURISPRUDENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 513 (Lucius Caflish et al. eds., 2005);
1 DIEGO J. LIÑÁN NOGUERAS, EL PROYECTO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO Y LA
INTERPRETACIÓN DE DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA: ¿UNA
NUEVA DIMENSIÓN DEL ART. 10.2 CE? 933-46 (2005); Antonio Remiro Brotons, Politica
de los Derechos Humanos y Politica con los Derechos Humanos, 41 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 107 (1989).
139
Martín-Retortillo Baquer explains that the guarantee of fundamental rights
and individual freedoms is a multifaceted enterprise which requires different
methodologies in the European context. MARTÍN-RETORTILLO BAQUER, supra note
138, 125-27.
140
MANGAS MARTÍN, supra note 125, at 308. Nonetheless, in its judgments, the
Spanish Constitutional Court refuses to accept that Article 10.2 has caused a
constitutionalizing effect of international human rights instruments; Judgment
76/1982 of the Spanish Constitutional Court sets this precedent. See ANTONIO
FERNÁNDEZ TOMÁS, LA VÁLIDA CELEBRACIÓN Y LA INCORPORACIÓN DE LOS TRATADOS EN
LA JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL ESPAÑOLA 353 (Manuel Pérez González ed.,
1993).
141
Alfonso J. Iglesias Velasco, Reflexiones sobre la implementación de los tratados
internacionales por los tribunales domésticos: especial referencia a España, 29 ANUARIO
ESPAÑOL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 165, 169 (2013).
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cogens,142 problems arise when it is necessary to specify the content
of the obligations that the member States of the international
community are duty-bound to meet when these obligations go
beyond the narrow scope of jus cogens.143 But even if these problems
are not easily solved, the establishment of a criterion of maximum
openness is a great help, since an adequate interpretation of human
rights involves having recourse not only to formal international
instruments such as treaties but also to other types of non-formal
instruments such as the recommendations of treaty bodies, and
resolutions of certain international organizations that command
broad authority.144
Starting from this assumption, the Plurinational Constitutional
Court of Bolivia has ruled that the corpus juris of international
human rights law shall be understood in a comprehensive manner
and, to that end, even if some international legal instruments are not
strictly binding, they still serve a purpose by assisting in the
interpretation of the norms laid down in international treaties.145
The Court’s predecessor, the Provisional Constitutional Court,146
has stated that all the norms, principles, and guidelines regarding
various human rights-related topics are international instruments of
great significance for the implementation of international human
142
Accordingly, the judicial contributions of international human rights law
having jus cogens or customary international law status are especially justifiable.
Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1166, 1168 (Michel
Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
143
See Antonio Fernández Tomás, El Jus Cogens y las Obligaciones Derivadas de
Normas Imperativas: Entre el Mito y la Realidad, in SOBERANÍA DEL ESTADO Y DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 619 (Marina Vargas Gómez-Urrutia & Ana Salinas de Frías eds.,
2005).
144
SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 89. Saiz Arnaiz also highlights that, on the
basis of full openness, “the Spanish Constitutional Court has had recourse not only
to related international treaties but also to the decisions emanating from their treaty
bodies, in addition to other texts produced by international organizations to which
Spain is party but which are, in principle, non-binding.” Id.; see also ARGELIA
QUERALT JIMÉNEZ, LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS: DEL TRIBUNAL DE
ESTRASBURGO AL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL (2008) (discussing the protection of
human rights from the European supranational structure).
145
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 6, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1130/2012, at III.2 (Bol.).
146
The Provisional Constitutional Court assumed the protection of the
Constitution during the process to elect the Plurinational Constitutional Court,
pursuant to the new rules of the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of
Bolivia. See id.
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rights treaties and the constitution and, therefore, they constitute
guidelines for their interpretation.147 Constitutional standards
should be addressed in a comprehensive way, with resort to various
international instruments to specify the scope and content of human
rights and guarantees.148
The Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia has noted that,
in accordance with the constitution’s Article 13.IV in fine, the Court
needs to include in its interpretative guidelines the principles
developed by international human rights treaties, which expand
even more the spectrum of relevance of international human rights
law.149 As far as its scope is concerned, there is no doubt that Article
13.IV in fine is unparalleled, since it not only refers to the
interpretation of fundamental rights, but covers all the rights
enumerated in the Bolivian constitutional text. On the basis of this
rule, it is possible to prove that the Plurinational Constitutional
Court of Bolivia is directly linked to the content of international
human rights treaties. The Court uses these treaties to justify the
open attitude adopted by its judges toward the interpretation of
constitutional rights, properly completing what we might call the
irradiation ratio of international human rights law upon the national
legal system.150 The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudential activity
is oriented toward the broadest possible interpretation of
constitutional rights with full respect for international standards,
endowing the new Bolivian constitutional text with a considerable
degree of openness.151
Some scholars and justices on the Court have interpreted Article
13.IV in fine as a subsidiary clause, holding that a stricter, more
literal method of constitutional construction is to be preferred with
regard to human rights.152 Should this method turn out to be
insufficient to determine the scope of constitutional standards, then
a subjective but still strict, literal method is to be used, with the scope
of the constitutional text defined according to the intent of the
See id.
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 27, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0061/2010-R, at III.4.2 (Bol.).
149
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.).
150
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 6, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1130/2012, at III.2 (Bol.).
151 See id.
152 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.).
147
148
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Constituent Assembly, as expressly demonstrated in its working
documents.153 If these two methods fail to establish clearly the
meaning of a constitutional text, then the interpretation must be
carried out in accordance with international human rights treaties. 154
This is a totally restrictive interpretation that most members of the
Plurinational Constitutional Court have not embraced.
It is safe to say that Article 13.IV in fine becomes a real window
that opens onto international human rights law, making it possible
to choose an interpretation that lends the constitution an open
quality capable of enriching and reinforcing the rights contained in
the new constitutional text.155 This window provides the Bolivian
catalogue of rights with higher standards of protection that turn the
national constitution into a truly progressive text. Bolivian domestic
law can be described accurately as capable of influencing, and being
influenced by, international law in its struggle for the defense of
human rights and the search for proper levels of protection for its
citizens.
iii. Article 256.II
In addition to Article 13.IV in fine, another rule must be
considered which opens a window to the interpretation of
constitutional rights through international instruments: Article
256.II of the constitution governs the interpretation of international
human rights treaties, and is of crucial importance to the
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudential activity.156 Article 256.II
153
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 27, 2013, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1011/2013, at III.1 (Bol.).
154
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 29, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0547/2011-R, at 2 (Bol.).
155
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 24, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0224/2012, at III.5 (Bol.) (“[A]mong other
interpretations, the right to defense must be interpreted in accordance with the
International Human Rights Treaties ratified by the Plurinational State of Bolivia,
pursuant to the last sentence of Article 13.IV of the Constitution, raising its
interpretation to related parameters found in international documents.”).
156
GOMES CANOTILHO & MOREIRA supra note 129, at 143 (pointing out that the
introduction of international standards in the internal law of Portugal led to the
promotion of international law by means of individual references). A similar
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establishes that “the rights recognized in the Constitution shall be
interpreted in accordance with international human rights treaties
when the latter provide more favorable norms.”157
In this respect, the Constitutional Court issued an opinion
centered around the principles of pro homine158 and “progressive
realization”159 (precisely what is sought to be accomplished with
“the most favorable interpretation”) regarding the interpretation of
human rights, opting for the broadest sense of both principles.160 Pro
homine refers to interpreting norms consistently to give the widest
possible scope to human dignity and well-being. “Progressive
realization” speaks to the objective of achieving the highest possible
standards of human rights protection over time. The Court has held
that its jurisprudential activity must follow the principle of
“progressive realization” and that, in the presence of various
impression is made by Article 16.2 of the Portuguese Constitution. According to
this criterion, the interpretation of Portuguese fundamental rights shall not prevail
if it fails to lead up to a more favorable interpretation of those rights, which helps
protect internal law when it is capable of providing the highest level of protection.
See JOSÉ JOAQUIM GOMES CANOTILHO, DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL 682-83 (6th ed. 1996).
157
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 256.II (Bol.).
158
See Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts 14(1), 1(1) and
2, American Convention on Human Rights), Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC7/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 7, ¶ 36 (Aug. 29, 1986) (Escalante, J., dissenting)
(describing pro homine as “the fundamental criterion which creates the very nature
of human rights [and] requires that the norms which guarantee or extend human
rights be broadly interpreted and those that limit or restrict human rights be
narrowly interpreted”).
159 “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been said to have
made a twofold interpretation of the principle of progressive realization: on one
hand, as an interpretation of the text that takes into account the objective of the term
at the moment of its application and, on the other, as a method used to update the
agreement that empowers the judge to revise it according to the current social
needs.” Ezequiel Malarino, Activismo Judicial, Punitivización y Nacionalización.
Tendencias Antidemocráticas y Antiliberales de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, in SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y
DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 25, 32 (Gisela Elsner, 2010).
160
See Julieta Rossi & Víctor Abramovich, La tutela de los derechos económicos,
sociales y culturales en el artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos
Humanos, 9 ESTUDIOS SOCIO-JURÍDICOS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 34, 48 (2007) (arguing that “the
principle of pro homine is useful to defining the scope of social rights addressed in
Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, but always in accordance
with the regulations of international law that consecrate rights and not to help the
interpreter establish beforehand whether a given right is implicit in the Charter of
the Organization of American States [(“OAS”)] and, for that matter, in Article 26 of
the American Convention on Human Rights”).
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possible meanings, the broadest interpretation that least restrains
the violated right or guarantee must be chosen161 when it comes to
the recognition of rights.
Meanwhile, the most restrictive
interpretation must be chosen when it comes to placing limits on the
exercise of rights.162 All of this ensures the broadest possible
protection of rights. The Court’s discussion of Article 256.II,
however, makes it clear that, while there have been efforts to find a
way to open constitutional rights to international law,163 there also
have been attempts to interpret such rights by placing restrictions
likely to prevent such an opening from being unconditional,164 even
though this overlooks the fact that the minimum standards
established by international law and adopted through universally
recognized instruments should not be ignored.165
Article 256.II also states that the interpretative opening must be
respectful of the interpreted text and, therefore, consistent with its
tradition and context.166 While human rights tend to become
161
See Mónica Pinto, El principio pro homine. Criterios de hermenéutica y pautas
para la regulación de los derechos humanos, in LA APLICACIÓN DE LOS TRATADOS SOBRE
DERECHOS HUMANOS POR LOS TRIBUNALES LOCALES 163, 163-72 (1997) (describing the
legitimate restrictions and the principle of pro homine).
162
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 29, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0547/2011-R, at 2 (Bol.); Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 6, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional,
No. 0006/2010-R, at III.1.2 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 13,
2010, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0023/2010-R, at III.1 (Bol.).
163
See Moreno, supra note 81, at 156–57 (noting that opening constitutional
rights to international human rights law is another typical feature of certain
contemporary Latin American constitutions, although there are differences
concerning ways, effects, and purposes, depending on the relevant constitution).
164
See LEÓN BASTOS, supra note 121, at 49–57 (noting that, owing to the
preferential rank of human rights, the whole legal order is interpreted in such a way
that they become more effective and capable of developing their potential, whether
they come from a national or an international source). Such a favorable approach
must be used to interpret not only the rights, but also the rest of the constitutional
rules, since the rights are a parameter that the interpreter cannot possibly disregard.
165
See Vásquez Vejarano v. Peru, Case 11.166, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 48/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 55 (2000) (stating that
“[a]lthough in general the ‘margin of appreciation’ is left to the states themselves”
regarding the fulfillment of rights, the IACHR has underscored that such margin is
not unlimited, as well as that the Commission has the duty to evaluate it and that
“the margin of appreciation at the internal level goes hand in hand with interAmerican supervision”).
166
See HANS PETER SCHNEIDER, DEMOCRACIA Y CONSTITUCIÓN 21 (1991)
(arguing that it is necessary to update human rights by means of an effective policy
of realization in addition to any legal definition and interpretation).
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universal, their content cannot be understood as identical
throughout all societies, because the protected “legal goods” vary
from one country to another depending on the characteristics of
their population. 167 This assertion is by no means a negation of the
universal nature of principles and rights, but an indication that
whenever the content of a right is not clear, an interpretation is
preferred which proves to be more in keeping with the
constitutional system from whence it comes, and, therefore, with the
traditions and values of the society that protects them. 168
It should be pointed out in this context that the structure of the
catalogue of rights found in the constitution is vital at the
international level, given the wide margin for interpretation allowed
by the constitution’s considerable degree of detail and complexity.
Article 256.II paves the way for two kinds of interpretation, as a twoway, dialectical mechanism of protection: on the one hand, an
interpretation of constitutional rights as a function of international
human rights law and, on the other, an interpretation of the latter as
a function of the former. This turn towards domestic law in the
stipulation of standards, however, must be totally in line with the
minimum standards of protection and guarantee established at the
167
See Javier García Roca, Soberanía Estatal Versus Integración Europea Mediante
Unos Derechos Fundamentales Comunes: ¿Cuál es el Margen de Apreciación Nacional?, in
INTEGRACIÓN EUROPEA A TRAVÉS DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: DE UN SISTEMA
BINARIO A OTRO INTEGRADO 15, 16-17 (Javier García Roca & Pablo A. Fernández
Sánchez eds., 2009) (acknowledging that the European Court of Human Rights
frequently uses the clause known as “national margin of appreciation,” through
which “some governments facing accusations expect that absolute understanding
of national sovereignty will allow the States to avoid European control in certain
cases”). But see Roberto Toniatti, Sovereignty Lost, Constitutional Identity Regained, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 49, 67 (Alejandro
Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013) (noting that the “recognition of
the national margin of appreciation is invariably conditioned by the contextual
recognition of its compatibility with the [European Convention on Human Rights]
as interpreted by the [European Court of Human Rights]”).
168
See DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 49-50. It is also noticeable that in certain
cases the European Union’s system for human rights protection grants national
authorities plenty of liberty to weigh the interests in dispute, recognizing national
margins of appreciation as capable of invalidating communal norms when
determining the need for and proportionality of the measure adopted to the
detriment of communal freedom and in favor of the fundamental right which
seemed to be better protected by national legislation. María Díaz Crego, El Márgen
de Apreciación Nacional en la Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de Las Comunidades
Europeas Referida a Los Derechos Fundamentales, in INTEGRACIÓN EUROPEA A TRAVÉS DE
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: DE UN SISTEMA BINARIO A OTRO INTEGRADO 55, 63-65
(Javier García Roca & Pablo A. Fernández Sánchez eds., 2009).
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international level.169 In light of this fact, the Constitutional Court is
responsible for making an assessment that provides for the efficient
implementation of both domestic and international norms,
regardless of the original source of the standard of protection, in
order to ensure respect for the pro homine and “progressive
realization” principles.170
b. Activity of the Constitutional Court
“Constitutions generally include various material content
shaped as rights, and drafted in such a way that their wide degree
of openness gives rise to high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity
and an obvious measure of subjectivity that makes those contents all
the more difficult to specify.”171 Although the Bolivian Constitution
enumerates its catalogue of rights with a wealth of detail, and lays
out positive actions to guarantee them, there is no denying that the
whole document is characterized by a high degree of subjectiveness,
invariably unavoidable no matter how detailed the constitutional
text was intended to be. Since anticipating all possible solutions in
a constitutional text is nothing less than unthinkable and impossible,
the Constitutional Court will have to overcome this difficulty
through a careful analysis of rights in the light of each specific
case.172
To this end, we now examine the activity of the
169
See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE, Sept. 17, 2005,
art. 5, ¶ 2 (recognizing limits to its sovereignty with respect to human rights).
170
See Pinto, supra note 161, at 166-71. Thus, the principle of pro homine
indicates that the customary treaties that explain the content of rights protected by
international instruments have room in the domestic legal system as long as they
improve its provisions.
171
See Santiago Sastre Ariza, La ciencia jurídica ante el neoconstitucionalismo, in
NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO(S) 239, 241 (Miguel Carbonell ed., 2003); see also LEÓN
BASTOS, supra note 121, at 42 (remarking that “the fundamental rights have a
number of distinctive features that account for their different interpretation and, as
a result of the language used to enumerate them in the Constitution and their highly
emotional punch, their interpretation is open to differentiat explanations from one
system to another”).
172
See generally Roberto L. Blanco Valdés, Vigilar al legislador, vigilar al vigilante
(legitimidad del control de constitucionalidad y selfrestraint judicial en los orígenes del
sistema norteamericano: un breve apunte histórico), in LA JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL EN
EL ESTADO DEMOCRÁTICO 17, 17–39 (Eduardo Espín Templado & F. Javier Díaz
Revorio eds., 2000) (illustrating that the constitutional interpretation is no less
marked by limitations).
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Constitutional Court regarding the open clauses that make it
possible to update human rights and link their interpretation to
international instruments. Special reference will be made as well to
the interpretation of indigenous people’s rights.
i.

Open Clauses

As stated earlier, the “open clause” can be used to resolve the
hierarchical rank of rights not enunciated in either the Bolivian
constitutional text or those international human rights treaties
ratified by Bolivia.173 The spirit of the Bolivian Constitution is to
provide full protection to human rights, whether or not they are
included in the national constitutional text or the international
human rights treaties ratified by the country. Nevertheless, so far,
the work of the Constitutional Court has not always followed this
path, developing instead a rather restrictive case law even as it seeks
to ensure the incorporation of human rights into the Bolivian
catalogue of rights.174
173
See Pablo Santolaya, La apertura de las Constituciones a su interpretación
conforme a los tratados internacionales, in DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS
HUMANOS: ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES 447,
448 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera García eds., 2013) (indicating
that the open clause is about a dialogue-based system designed to use interpretation
in order to integrate human rights into the fundamental rights of each instrument).
The Constitution itself establishes the obligation of domestic courts to ensure the
interpretative openness of fundamental rights through international treaties. Id.
174
See, e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Oct. 10, 2011, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 1448/2011-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr.
25, 2011, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0511/2011-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional
Plurinacional, Nov. 19, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 2238/2010-R (Bol.);
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 19, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional,
2189/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0922/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional,
Aug. 10, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0885/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 10, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No.
0874/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 15, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0334/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June
15, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0325/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional
Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0296/2010-R (Bol.);
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No.
0295/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0275/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June
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As far as Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II of the constitution are
concerned, however, the Court has used them to effectively make an
open interpretation of human rights.
Through the Court’s
interpretation of these articles, international human rights
instruments have become a jurisprudential canon, by constitutional
imperative, with a view to the regulation of constitutionally
enunciated rights and freedoms bound to be an unavoidable
reference.175 Meanwhile, the international openness of Bolivian
domestic legislation to international human rights law is beyond
question. In this regard, the Court establishes that, in order to avoid
infringing on the values of justice and equality and, therefore, the
principle of reasonableness, any interpretation of the requirements
or conditions to participate in the development of “cooperative
willingness”176 shall always be extensive, favorable, and in
accordance with Articles 13.IV and 256 of the constitution.177
It must be underscored that, as part of the Court’s
jurisprudential activity, it is mandatory to have recourse to
international treaties with a view to the interpretation of rights. The
interpretative standards stipulated in Articles 13.IV and 256 must
not be used unrestrainedly, as they compel the Court to interpret the
rights and duties in the constitution in accordance with those
7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, 0268/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional
Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0264/2010-R (Bol.);
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 31, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No.
0259/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 24, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0211/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May
24, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0202/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional
Plurinacional, May 24, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0197/2010-R (Bol.);
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 4, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No.
0096/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 4, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0092/2010-R (Bol.). The Plurinational Constitutional Court of
Bolivia, in these cases, did not grant the right to judicial protection for any
constitutional status on grounds that it is not specifically stipulated as a right,
refusing to provide the said legal safeguard through a Constitutional effective
remedy. Such a decision entailed a restrictive interpretation of human rights,
because, in accordance with the open clause of the Constitution, these rights
deserve legal protection even if they are not explicitly defined as such. However,
its alleged non-equivalence to be literally considered as a right has been sufficient
for the Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia to refuse the said protection.
175
SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 153.
176
“Cooperative willingness” refers to the attitude, or spirit, that should
characterize the relationship of national judges to international judicial bodies.
177
See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 16. 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0085/2012, at III.3.d (Bol.).
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international human rights treaties ratified by Bolivia. While citing
the international instrument in a judgment is not formally a
requirement178 (on the grounds that it is sufficient to adjust the
content of interpretation to the standards of international human
rights treaties already incorporated into domestic legislation 179),
their specific inclusion in a given Court decision is an adequate and
desirable option. As maintained here, the mandatory nature of
constitutional articles, and the fact that the judges cannot just put
aside the interpretation of rights on the basis of international law
whenever it suits them, means that their interpretation must be
explicitly articulated in their decisions together with a reference to
the relevant treaty. Only after its mention in the Court’s decision
can the use of one or more normative instruments be properly
encouraged.180 Therefore, while mentioning such an assessment in
the judgment is not formally a sine qua non, it is strongly held to be
extremely desirable in order to achieve a better understanding and
implementation of the relevant canons of interpretation.
The interpretations of the Constitutional Court have proved to
be indispensable in the application of external human rights sources
to the new Bolivian context. These interpretations have been
directed toward the accomplishment of the constitution’s maximum

178
Steinhardt asserts that an effective protection of rights by domestic courts
does not always require explicit consideration and application of the international
treaties. Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International
Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 267, 267
(Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004).
179
SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 205-06 (interpreting Article 10.2 of the
Spanish Constitution).
180
Javier Roldán Barbero, Jurisprudencia en Materia de Derecho Internacional
Público, 62 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 165, 166 (2010). Professor
Roldán Barbero concludes, in regard to

the case of Spain, that the incorporation of international parameters into
jurisprudence is limited by a number of factors, including the
terminological inappropriateness and conceptual uncertainty of judicialinternational issues, the poor qualification required in international
legislation to administer justice at the national level, and a governmental
conception of foreign policy that forces judges to act with extreme caution
when making incursions into this field, all of which turn the application
of international law at the domestic level into a monotonous, repetitive,
and hardly original task.
Id.
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openness to international human rights law.181 The Court has held
that the constitution shall be mandatorily interpreted in accordance
with Articles 256 and 13.IV, finding that constitutional rights must
be interpreted according to international human rights treaties, and
fully taking into consideration the historic origin of constitutional
texts long devoted to throwing into relief the permanent struggle for
the recognition and effectiveness of such rights.182
The Court also has found that this matter is completely in
agreement with the intent of the Constituent Assembly, which
established the guarantee of rights as one of the purposes and
functions of the State, as stipulated in Article 8.4 of the constitution,
revealing thereby its willingness to provide the best possible
protection of rights.183 By means of the dissenting vote cast by one
of the members of the Constitutional Court—repeatedly used as case
law—it was established that, in addition to the observance of the
criteria laid down in Article 196.II of the constitution, that is to say,
the literal tenor of the text and the intent of the Constituent
Assembly, other sources which set forth the principle of

181
SCHNEIDER, supra note 166, at 18 (suggesting that “fundamental rights
cannot be understood as a simple formal demarcation between certain degrees of
willingness, since in that case they would waste away and become limits of nonintervention”).
182
IACHR judgments mention the judicial guarantees and effective judicial
protection of judges in Title III.1. They also reference the instruments stated in Title
III.2.2 about the provision of protection in cases of failure to observe the said
instruments. See e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Mar. 6, 2017, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0171/2017-S2, at 19 (Bol.); Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 5, 2016, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional,
No. 1268/2016-S2, at 2-17 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 5, 2016,
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1264/2016-S2, at 10 (Bol.); Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 7, 2016, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional,
No. 1109/2016-S1, at 10 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 26, 2016,
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0922/2016-S2, at 4 (Bol.); Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 7, 2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional,
No. 1226/2015-S1, at 14-15 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 16,
2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1181/2015-S1, at 2 (Bol.); Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 6, 2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional,
No. 1149/2015-S1, at 6-7 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 5, 2015,
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1101/2015-S3, at 7 (Bol.); Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 5, 2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional,
No. 1074/2015-S3, at 8-9 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17,
2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0832/2015-S3, at 10 (Bol.).
183
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 9, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0510/2012, at III.3.3 (Bol.).
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interpretation in accordance with international treaties184 must be
considered. Among these are Articles 13.IV and 256 of the
constitution, which entail recognition of the principles of pro homine
and “progressive realization.” These criteria are held to be typical
of a principista (principles-based) and garantista (rights-based)
Constitutional Court.185
Even beyond the interpretation criteria stipulated in Article
196.II of the constitution, the failure to implement Articles 13.IV in
fine and 256 would bring with it an interpretatio in peius and,
therefore, create a vacuum in Bolivian constitutional justice, causing
judicial uncertainty in the Unified Social State of Plurinational
Communitarian Law.
The latter body of law imposes on
constitutional interpreters the obligation to safeguard the values and
principles of the Bolivian State, which in turn are intended to protect
human dignity and “society’s sensibility.”186 According to the
Constitutional Court, any interpretation of the constitution must be
based upon an extendable and favorable criterion, which requires
the assurance of the best possible protection of constitutional rights
through an interpretation underpinned by international standards
in accordance with Articles 13.IV and 256. 187 In this connection, the
Court also indicated that the interpretation of rights should comply
with Article 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights to
preserve the values of justice and equality, as well as to avoid
jeopardizing the principle of reasonableness, thus giving full effect
and judicial relevance to the interpretative canons of the American
Convention.188
As emphasized by the Constitutional Court, Articles 13.IV and
256 explicitly stipulate that the rights enshrined in the constitution
184
See Eyal Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de
Droit International’s Resolution on ‘The Activities of National Courts and the International
Relations of their State’, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 423, 427-28 (1994).
185
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Oct. 21, 2011, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 1688/2011-R, at 4 (Bol.).
186
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 13, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0406/2011-R, at 5 (Bol.).
187
See e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17, 2010, No.
0980/2010-R, at 5 (Bol.).
188
García Roca, supra note 167, at 15-16. It is worth mentioning that
“conferring jurisdiction over fundamental rights on international bodies is an
obvious form of a State’s self-restraint in the exercise of its decision-making,
jurisdictional, and revising competencies.” Id.
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shall be interpreted in accordance with international human rights
treaties that are similarly observed by other supranational bodies,
including the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.189 When it
comes to the interpretation of rights, the Constitutional Court has
incorporated not only formal but also material international
instruments which, despite not being mentioned in the
constitutional text, the Court has ratified and implemented in its
jurisprudential activity. In this manner, the Court has treated nonformal international norms such as the interpretations made by
international courts in matters of human rights as essential to the
interpretation of constitutional rights on account of their axiological
or principles-based values.
Thus, the Constitutional Court has embraced and validated
interpretations of human rights stemming from international courts
over which it has no jurisdiction.190 This fact is fully consistent with
the assumption that, in the process of judicial incorporation of
human rights emanating from international instruments, the rights
proclaimed by international instruments ensure that they be
discussed or recognized. The decisions and interpretations made by
international courts also have special relevance in the process of
reinforcing and extending the international character of human
rights.191
The Court also has declared unconstitutional the use of
international instruments out of context, or when the instruments
are manipulated to justify domestic actions even though such
actions would constitute a flagrant violation of constitutional
obligations.192 As the Court sees it, the need to fulfill the
189
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 14, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0460/2011-R, at 2-3 (Bol.) (establishing that “another
reason to give the Judgments emanated from the IACHR constitutional
preeminence over domestic law is the so-called Doctrine of Useful Effect of the
Judgments in matters of human rights, the same one developed by the IACHR
itself”).
190 See id.
191
Chang & Yeh, supra note 142, at 1168.
192
See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Feb. 21, 2014, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0362/2014 (Bol.). Noticeable in this judgment is
the declaration of the unconstitutional nature of imposing, as legal standards about
military interventions in domestic conflicts, principles and regulations that govern
the control of international armed conflicts, thus denouncing the capricious
interpretation of the rules from the viewpoint of the State’s intent by pointing out
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constitution’s normative content demands a jurisprudential activity
capable of bridging infra-constitutional gaps, solving conflicts, and
preventing collision of laws, always considering the constitutional
text as the preeminent source. The only exception to this
understanding would be the appearance of international human
rights law on the scene, in such a manner as established by Articles
13, 256.II, and 410 of the constitution.193
The treatment given to human rights through constitutional
provisions is understood both in a unitary manner, as when rights
are approached in a comprehensive way, and in a dynamic manner,
because, according to its norms, the Bolivian catalogue of rights is
always open and, therefore, in constant evolution. Another
consequence of the new interpretative criteria is that the
constitutional interpreters cannot make an interpretation of rights
and their guarantees solely from a national standpoint. They also
must make sense of their interpretation on the basis of the rules
contained in international human rights instruments. 194
With the inclusion of Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, the
constitution envisages appropriate keys for the interpretation of
constitutional rights, since it establishes guidelines intended to
make it possible for Bolivian domestic law to influence, and be
influenced by, international human rights law in order to guarantee
effective protection of rights.195 These provisions are new in
that the instruments used to deal with armed conflicts shall not be taken as being
similar to those used to solve domestic or social conflicts in the way intended by
said regulations. Id. The Plurinational Constitutional Court indicated that the
enforcement of international humanitarian law regulations in cases not recognized
therein entail their normative infringement. Id. However, the dissenting vote cast
by Judge Ligia Mónica Velásquez Castaños on February 21, 2014 said that the
above-mentioned regulations should have been declared constitutional in light of
the prevailing climate of conflicts in the country, wrongly putting the concepts of
armed conflict and internal conflict on a level with occasional occurrences leading
up to domestic conflicts, the extent and connotations of which are actually quite
different. Id.
193
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 16, 2013, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1357/2013, at III.1 (Bol.).
194
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 20, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 1132/2011-R (Bol.).
195
It can be said that international human rights law has not evolved equally
around the world, with the United States considered a special case. CURTIS A.
BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM, at xi–xiii (2013). On one
hand, the scope of international law has increased significantly and gained a strong
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Bolivian constitutional history. It is the first time that constitutional
norms are enumerated in such a way that they open themselves up
to interpretation with reference to international human rights
instruments. This fact sets in relief Bolivia’s awareness of the crucial
relevance of international human rights law. With a basis on the
constitution’s interpretation, the Court’s domestic constitutional
legislation has widened the constitution’s horizons regarding the
protection of rights from what we might call a multilevel
perspective.196
ii.

Indigenous Rights

The content of Bolivian constitutional rights ranges from the
symbolic consecration of rights and principles to the thorough
definition of rights and their normatively precise guarantee, always
on the basis of the defense and promotion of indigenous cultures
and customs. Since the content of these rights cannot be expressed
literally in all their possible dimensions, it is essential to have
recourse to other normative frameworks. This, in turn, brings
international human rights law to the foreground, as part of an
attempt to make combinations among, and set boundaries between,
the rights of the indigenous peoples and other types of rights.197
The appeal to international human rights law must preserve the
meaning of national norms and the characteristic identity of
constitutional norms as much as possible, paying particular
presence in domestic legislation, particularly when it comes to human rights, as
evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled over a
number of cases on the basis of international human rights law. Id. On the other
hand, however, the U.S. approach can be seen as “selective and pragmatic,” always
concerned about which international law to incorporate into its legislation, and
undeniably bent on giving control over the application of international law to
political organs. Id. at xiii. So even if judges play a role in the enforcement of
international law, they usually abide by the decisions and actions of the U.S.
executive branch and Congress. Id.
196
See PAOLA BILANCIA & FEDERICO GUSTAVO PIZZETTI, ASPETTI E PROBLEMI DEL
COSTITUZIONALISMO MULTILIVELLO 259-66 (2004) (discussing the conflicts and
synergies concerning the protection of rights on various institutional levels).
197
HÄBERLE, supra note 12, at 99-104. “As a result of interpretative openness,
it is always possible to make lone interpretations of a right contained in different
findings of the regional Constitutional Courts with a view to enriching the court’s
own assessments and interpretations.” Id.
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attention to the rights of the indigenous peoples. 198
The
circumstances surrounding the activity of legal systems are of
paramount importance to understanding how to enforce their rules
because the various interpretations of conflicting rights are
contingent on their individual features. All these considerations put
special obstacles in the path of the interpretation of rights.199 The
complex nature of the catalogue of rights stipulated in the
constitution makes it impossible to seek conventional solutions if we
take into account that it would be highly difficult for such solutions
to succeed in the vast diversity of dimensions that characterize and
define Bolivian rights. The wide-ranging catalogue of rights
established in the new Bolivian constitutional text can give rise to
conflicts among them and even to reciprocal relations likely to be
identified “zero sum.”200 Therefore, the treatment of these rights
from a constitutional viewpoint is an extremely sensitive matter. 201
198
See Horst Schönbohm, El Pluralismo Jurídico – Una Comparación a Nivel de
América Latina, in LOS DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES Y DERECHOS COLECTIVOS EN LA
CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL PLUALISMO JURÍDICO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 35, 37 (Susanne Käss &
Claudia Heins eds., 2011) (stating that “through the ratification of international
instruments, Bolivia starts to recognize judicial pluralism and that a comprehensive
review of international law will contribute to making indigenous rights twice as
strong, both at the national and international level”).
199
See ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, ESCRITOS SOBRE DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES 67-68 (Juan Luis Requejo Pagés & Ignacio Villaverde Menéndez
trans., 1993) (stating that in no case would any theories of interpretation be
excluded, which means that the interpretation of rights can find support in different
foundations at the interpreters’ discretion).
200
Anna Pintore, Derechos insaciables, in LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES 243, 258 (Antonio de Cabo & Gerardo Pisarello eds., Perfecto
Andres, et al. trans., 2001).
201
Rights in Bolivia start by reconstructing judicial logic from a collective
perspective and transforming individual canons, which does entail an adaptation
to post-colonial pluralism, according to long-settled accumulated procedures. Farit
L. Rojas Tudela, Del Monismo al Pluralismo Jurídico: Interculturalidad en el Estado
Constitucional, in LOS DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES Y DERECHOS COLECTIVOS EN LA
CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL PLURALISMO JURÍDICO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 21, 28-31 (Susanne
Käss & Claudia Heins eds., 2011). In reference to the problems of compatibility
between indigenous rights and other rights, Waldo Albarracín Sánchez holds that
“there is no extrapolation between them, nor do any of those rights subordinate to
another, since they are not only perfectly compatible, but also mutually dependent
and capable of complementing one another.” Waldo Albarracín Sánchez, La
Protección de los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas en el Derecho Internacional, in LOS
DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES Y DERECHOS COLECTIVOS EN LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL
PLURALISMO JURÍDICO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 67, 82 (Susanne Käss & Claudia Heins
eds., 2011).
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For these reasons, the main goal in constitutional jurisprudence
is to encourage an interpretation that prevents the links among
constitutional instruments from manifesting themselves as a
relationship based on independence or hierarchy rather than one
based on continuity and mutual reciprocity. Weighing the different
norms202 in this case proves to be the perfect procedure to solve cases
involving principles that tend to be contradictory but capable,
theoretically speaking, of coexisting together with the relevant laws
or regulations that enshrine those principles. In this respect, rather
than challenging the constitutional character of a right-protecting
law, judges interpret it in such a way that the strength of its
underlying principle is in harmony with that of the conflicting
principle.203
In light of Bolivia’s multi-ethnic and pluricultural
characteristics, it is necessary to consider various solutions vis-à-vis
the interpretation of the rights of indigenous peoples. 204 We must
bear in mind that a superficial universality of human rights based
only on Western ontological conceptions can prove to be largely
incompatible with native models that are not in harmony with them,
even when those Western conceptions might enjoy international
acceptance. The negation of a constructive dialogue about the
indigenous models would be opposite to the spirit of human rights,
as it would entail a sort of “ultracriminalization” of the native
systems.205
Under this premise, the constitution recognizes

202
For analysis concerning ponderation as a technique to apply instruments
based on fundamental rights, see DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 51-54.
203
Luis Prieto Sanchís, Neoconstitucionalismo y Ponderación Judicial, 5 ANUARIO
DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID 201, 205
(2001).
204
See Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation],
Ley No. 073, art. 12 (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.). One of the main conflictcreating aspects has been the stipulation that the decisions related to “Indigenous
Jurisdiction” shall be mandatory and cannot be revised by other jurisdictions. Id.
The Plurinational Constitutional Court has not only made it clear that it is
important to have different judicial systems to protect Bolivian pluralism, but has
also emphasized that the systems, just like any other jurisdiction, shall be subject to
the control of the Plurinational Constitutional Court, which is as much binding on
formal legislation as it is on the laws of the indigenous peoples, be they enunciated
or not.
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 18, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0300/2012, at III.1.2 (Bol.).
205
Armin Von Bogdandy, Configurar la Relación entre el Derecho Constitucional
y el Derecho Internacional Público, 6 INT’L. J. CON. L. 397 (2007).
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“indigenous jurisdiction”206 as equal in status to the ordinary
jurisdiction207. Such jurisdiction is to be exercised by the indigenous
community authorities, who shall apply their own principles,
cultural values, norms and procedures, while respecting the rights
and guarantees established in the constitution.208
The exercise of “indigenous jurisdiction” is subject to further
restrictions209 defined by the minimum standards of international
law. In this respect, Bolivian legislation has stipulated that
“indigenous jurisdiction” shall respect and guarantee the exercise of
women’s rights, participation, presence and permanence, both
regarding their right to equal and just access to any job or position,
and to the control of, decisions about, and participation in, the

206
According to article 191 of the Bolivian Constitution, the Indigenous
Jurisdiction applies to the members of the indigenous peoples whose relations and
juridical acts, or the resulting effects thereof, take place within the indigenous
community. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 191 (Bol.). On the
other hand, Article 8 of the Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation emphasizes that the
Indigenous Jurisdiction is exercised in the areas of personal, material, and territorial
legal effect when these elements concur, which means that only exclusively
indigenous affairs shall be subject to this jurisdiction, whereas any other matter
shall be under the ordinary jurisdiction See Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of
Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley No. 073, art. 8 (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia
(Bol.).
207
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 179 (Bol.).
208 Id. art. 190.
209
Under “Indigenous Jurisdiction” courts shall not hear crimes against
international law, crimes against humanity, crimes against the internal State and
external security, terrorism, tax and customs law violations, corruption and any
other crime against the State, human trafficking and people smuggling, arms
dealing and crimes related to drug-trafficking, crimes against the physical integrity
of children and teenagers, rape, murder or homicide, any process to which the State
is party or interested third party through its central decentralized autonomous
administration, and all crimes related to copyright law. See Ley de Deslinde
Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley No. 073, art. 10 § II (2010),
Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.). Nor shall it hear legal matters related to labor, social
security, taxation, administrative affairs, mining operations, hydrocarbons,
forestry, computer science, international law and agrarian law, except those
concerning the internal distribution of lands under legal ownership or collective
proprietary right. Id. Regarding this demarcation of the competence of
“Indigenous Jurisdiction,” its final scope only addresses peripheral matters, that is,
whatever can be resolved through legal control systems, which requires that true
indigenous justice is bound to be structured on the basis of the new Bolivian
constitutional text. CARLOS ALBERTO GOITIA, CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA Y JUSTICIA
INDÍGENA ORIGINARIA CAMPESINA: POTESTADES DE GENERACIÓN NORMATIVA Y DE
ADMINISTRACIÓN DE JUSTICIA 345 (2012).
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administration of justice.210 In no case shall the rulings of the
indigenous courts mandate the loss of land by, or the expulsion of,
senior citizens or persons with disabilities on grounds of their failure
to fulfill duties, obligations, contributions or communal
responsibilities.211 The legislation also categorically prohibits and
punishes all forms of violence against children, teenagers and
women, and rules out any form of conciliation related to these
offenses, declaring that any agreements involving these matters are
illegal.212
It is important to highlight the expected interpretation of
constitutional rights as individually and collectively recognized, since
both forms of recognition involve a special type of protection. This
new approach to understanding human rights in the Plurinational
State of Bolivia must be carefully followed by the Constitutional
Court in order to pay attention to, and preserve, the existing
boundaries between collective and individual rights. Owing to the
forms of communal relationships embraced by the indigenous
peoples, the ways of enforcing legislation are also deemed to
encompass the overall indigenous population rather than merely the
individual.213 This is also in line with recognition of indigenous
rights by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.214
210
Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley
No. 073, art. 5 § II (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.).
211 Id. art. 5; see also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 191
(Bol.) (establishing that courts exercising rural native indigenous jurisdiction hear
rural native matters as set out in the Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation).
212
Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley
No. 073, art. 5 §§ III, IV (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.).
213
Vega Camacho, supra note 99, at 257-58
214
See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug.
31, 2001) (“Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition
regarding a communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that
ownership of the land is not centered on an individual but rather on the group and
its community.”). It is also recognized that that “[i]ndigenous peoples’ customary
law must be especially taken into account.“ Id. at ¶ 151. The IACHR also recognizes
the customary practices of indigenous communities and their communal link with
their territories. See, e.g., Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz y sue Miembros
v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 305, ¶ 100 (Oct. 8, 2015); The Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284, ¶ 129 (Nov.
25, 2015); The Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and
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The recognition of rights from a multiethnic and pluricultural
perspective undoubtedly goes beyond the old conception of rights
contained in previous constitutional texts. The inclusion of these
new rights makes it necessary for the constitution to open itself
widely to the incorporation of new cultural values and principles
which have been hitherto systematically disregarded. While Article
13.IV in fine paves the way for an interpretation in keeping with
international law, Article 256.II establishes at the same time that the
most favorable norms shall have preferential application. As this
provision clearly stipulates, the interpretation of rights shall be
based on the best protection that a norm can provide regardless of
its source and, therefore, it is imperative to ensure such protection.
International human rights law is then a strong driving force and
measure of human rights, but it always must be adjusted to an
indigenous people’s own system of laws. Even if the norms related
to human rights tend to become universal, it is also true that the
typical characteristics of every culture must be carefully weighed in
each particular case. The indeterminate provisions found in the
constitution can be considered a possible route for bringing in
international human rights law as a tool to resolve conflicts within
the indigenous jurisdiction.
Both the “open clause” and Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II of the
constitution represent a significant evolution in regard to the
interpretation of constitutional rights, because they respectively
allow for, and mandate, any interpretation to be based on the
provisions laid down in international human rights treaties.
The chief purpose of these measures is to safeguard the
minimum standards or contents of these rights insofar as
they are recognized in international instruments. In light of
the fact that the aforementioned norms, which are binding
even on legislators, specify non-negotiable standards
protected by the Constituent Assembly, but are in
permanent evolution.215

Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 145 (June 27, 2012);
The Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People
of Bayano and their Members v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
284, ¶ 111 (Oct. 14, 2014).
215
Santolaya, supra note 173, at 449
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Furthermore, their importance is maximized when they count upon
legal entities that are in charge of their interpretation and possible
revision.216
IV. THE POSITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE BOLIVIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM
As we have discussed, the Bolivian State established that the
proclamation of rights contained in its constitutional text shall not
be understood as a negation of other rights not enumerated in the
constitution. In addition, the classification of such rights does not
determine any hierarchy or superiority of some rights over others. 217
As a novelty in the Bolivian constitutional system, the constitution
incorporates Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, which state that the
rights and obligations recognized in the constitutional text shall be
interpreted in agreement with international human rights treaties.
All the above-mentioned provisions are highly relevant and
extremely important tools for the protection of rights. As a
prevailing tendency, Latin American constitutional texts have been
gradually incorporating articles that make it possible to legitimize
the privileged position of international law and, therefore, put it into
practice in a more effective way.218 Pursuant to this tendency, the
Bolivian Constituent Assembly included a number of provisions
that give shape to a system of sources that make room for
international human rights instruments.
In this section, we examine the position that the Bolivian system
has assigned to international human rights instruments and their
impact on the national system of laws. In particular, we analyze the
incorporation of international human rights treaties into the “Block

Id.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.II, 13.III (Bol.).
218
See Héctor Fix-Zamudio, El Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos en
las Constituciones Latinoamericanas y en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,
75 BOLETÍN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 749 (1992) (noticing this tendency
in the 1990s, and remarking that, “generally speaking, the recognition of
international human rights instruments as a topic was being incorporated into the
Latin American constitutions in a rather cautious and biased manner”).
216
217
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of Constitutionality,”219 as well as the provisions that might even
give such treaty norms prevalence over the Bolivian constitutional
text itself, including details about the effect of specific cases on
domestic legislation.
a. Block of Constitutionality
In previous Bolivian constitutions, the position of international
human rights treaties was largely relegated to a secondary place.220
Not so in the new constitutional text.221 The incorporation of
international human rights treaties into the so-called Block of
Constitutionality blazes a trail for the protection of rights.
i.

Article 410.II

The new Bolivian constitutional text is built along a complex
spectrum of gradations and hierarchies involving international law.
While the constitution makes it clear that its text enjoys supremacy
over any other legislation, it opens the door for certain norms of
international law to be placed on par with its own hierarchical level.
This landmark in the recognition and protection of international
instruments would have been unthinkable in previous Bolivian
constitutions.

219
In Latin American law, the term “Block of Constitutionality” is used to
refer to the entire set or “block” or rules, norms, and decisions that enjoy
constitutional status.
220 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826 (Bol.) (conferring limited
rights to Bolivian citizens and empowering the legislature to enter into treaties);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861 (Bol.) (providing a general framework
for civil rights, while separately allocating power to approve international treaties
to the national legislature); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945 (Bol.)
(granting civil rights to Bolivian citizens, without referrence to international human
rights treaties and conventions).
221
ANTONIO ENRIQUE PÉREZ LUÑO, EL DESBORDAMIENTO DE LAS FUENTES DEL
DERECHO 76 (1993). Pérez Luño points out that the displacement of instruments is
due not only to the emergence of powers above the State, but also to the expansion
of normative jurisdiction of intermediate entities, all of which is conducive to a
pluralistic determination of judicial sources. Id.
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According to Article 410 of the constitution, “international
treaties ratified by Bolivia in matters of human rights are part of the
Block of Constitutionality.”222 This rule provides international
human rights treaties with the highest possible rank in the internal
system of laws.223 For all intents and purposes, the norms contained
in those treaties are standards of constitutionality for the rest of
Bolivia’s domestic laws.224 In this respect, international human
rights law goes beyond its usual status in other legal systems as the
provider of a canon of judicial interpretation, and it acquires a
constitutional rank that makes it especially strong and ensures its
protection by domestic legislation.
To this end, the Constituent Assembly relied on constitutional
recognition of international human rights treaties to stipulate the
prioritized protection of human rights. In the exercise of its power,
the State shall not restrain these rights, but rather be under their
control, thus acknowledging the importance of international human
rights law and other universal standards with a view to enforcing
them.225 The acceptance of the existence and recognition of
internationally agreed upon human rights is patently obvious, as is
the objective obligation to prevent their violation or any diminution
in their enjoyment and exercise, as an invaluable mainstay to

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 410.II (Bol.).
See, e.g., Contradicción de Tesis 239/2011. Suscitada entre los tribunales
colegiados de circuito tercero y cuarto, ambos del centro auxiliar de la tercera región
con residencia en Guadalajara, Jalisco, y el primer tribunal colegiado en materia de
trabajo del tercer circuito, Segunda Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la
Nación [SCJN], Agosto de 2011 (Mex.) (refusing to make a pronouncement on the
hierarchy of international instruments in matters of human rights, but deciding
that, pursuant to the interpretation of the constitutional reforms of June 6 and 10,
2011, the human rights norms were not hierarchically related to domestic legislation
except when the constitution expressly establishes some kind of restriction
regarding the exercise of human rights which are otherwise prioritized); see Ramón
Ortega García, La jerarquía de los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos a la
luz de la reforma constitucional del 10 de junio de 2011, 15 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 495 (2015).
224
See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY June 20, 1992, art.
142 (providing the international human rights treaties with constitutional status
through article 142, indicating that they may only be denounced by constitutional
amendment).
225 See Arturo Santiago Pagliari, Derecho Internacional y Derecho Interno. El
Sistema Constitutional Argentino, 7 ARS BONI ET AEQUI 17 (2011).
222
223
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guarantee their protection within the country.226 Accordingly, the
Constitutional Court has recognized that international human rights
instruments demand that the parties implement effective, prompt,
and efficient forms of protection against any act that may violate
these rights.227 This, in turn, is in accordance with the constitutional
rank granted to international human rights treaties, taking into
account that one of the most important ways to defend them is to
incorporate them into the domestic system of laws and give them
constitutional status.228
226
See JUAN CARLOS VEGA, MARISA ADRIANA GRAHAM & JUAN PABLO CAFIERO,
JERARQUÍA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES (1996). Javier
Armando Lorente points out that, in the case of Argentina, these Treaties shall only
be denounced after approval of two-thirds of all the members of each House, the
same majority required for a Constitutional Reform. JAVIER ARMANDO LORENTE,
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA Y TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES CON
JERARQUÍA CONSTITUCIONAL 77-78 (1994). In Armando Lorente’s opinion, the
denouncement of the international treaties will involve a sui generis constitutional
reform with practical and judicial consequences which are likely to be very difficult
to appreciate. Id. He also underscored that, in order to attain constitutional
hierarchy, any other international treaty shall also need the vote of two thirds of all
the members of each House.
227
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 7, 2011, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0375/2011-R (Bol.).
228
A different conclusion has been reached, for instance, by the Constitutional
Court of Chile, which stated that it is impossible to hold that the Constitution can
be amended by a treaty in matters of essential rights derived from human nature.
By handing down such a ruling, the Chilean court has categorically established that,
if the said treaty contains norms in disagreement with the Constitution, it can only
be rightfully incorporated into the domestic system of laws through a previous
constitutional reform. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 8 abril
2002, “Requerimiento Formulado por Diversos Diputados con el Objeto de que el
Tribunal Declare la Inconstitucionalidad del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal
Internacional, Adoptado en Dicha Ciudad el 17 de Julio de 1998, de Acuerdo al
Artículo 82, N°2, de la Constitución Política de la República,” Rol de la causa: 346
(Chile). The majority also affirmed the preeminence of the Constitution over
international treaties on grounds that the latter attain the legal status required to
become part of domestic legislation. It is worth mentioning that there is no
consensus regarding its hierarchy. Raúl Bertelsen Repetto, Rango Juridico de los
Tratados Internacionales en el Derecho Chileno, 23 REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 211,
221 (1996); Teodoro Ribera Neumann, Los Tratados Internacionales y su Control a
Posteriori por el Tribunal Constitucional, 5 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 89, 99 (2007).
Ribera Neumann says no international treaty capable of challenging constitutional
supremacy has ever been approved, in accordance with Article 54.1 of the Chilean
Constitution. Id. He has also remarked that the final part of the second item of
Article 5 of the Constitution does not turn the Human Rights Treaties ratified by
Chile into a “material Constitution,” nor does it ensure a tacit amendment of the
Constitution or its incorporation into what is understood as the Block of
Constitutionality. Id.
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In addition to giving international human rights treaties the
highest possible rank at the domestic level, the Constitutional Court
has established that the Block of Constitutionality includes the
jurisprudence229 emanating from the IACHR.230 Therefore, since all
the judgments issued by the IACHR shall prevail over, and be the
basis of, the whole domestic system of laws, all the norms and
decisions originating from the inter-American human rights system
govern the interpretation and implementation of human rights.231 It
is difficult to imagine a more comprehensive protection at a
domestic level of the judgments issued by the IACHR than the one
offered by the Bolivian Constitutional Court. 232 Through its
decision, the Constitutional Court has set in relief an integrated and
essential understanding of itself as the prime defender of rights in
229
Regarding the recognition of jurisprudence, the Spanish Constitutional
Court offers a highly relevant example by stating that in accordance with its
Constitution’s Article 10.2, not only shall the jurisprudence originating from the
European Court of Human Rights be used as an interpretative criterion, it shall also
take immediate effect in Spanish legislation. S.T.C., Oct. 25, 1993 (F.J., No.
303/1993, p. 8) (Spain); see also Eugeni Gay Montalvo, El diálogo del Tribunal
Constitucional Español con la doctrina de otros Tribunales, in DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL
EN DERECHOS HUMANOS: ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES
INTERNACIONALES 243, 252-53 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera
García eds., 2013).
230
Contradicción de Tesis 239/2011. Suscitada entre los tribunales colegiados
de circuito tercero y cuarto, ambos del centro auxiliar de la tercera región con
residencia en Guadalajara, Jalisco, y el primer tribunal colegiado en materia de
trabajo del tercer circuito, Segunda Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la
Nación [SCJN], Agosto de 2011 (Mex.). In the Mexican case, and following the
denunciation in June 24, 2011, the nation's Supreme Court decided that the
precedents established by the IACHR resolutions are binding, regardless of
whether Mexico has been involved in the relevant conflict, because they are an
extension of the international treaties being interpreted, giving full consideration to
the fact that it is on the basis of these criteria that the content of the human rights
stipulated by them will be determined. Id.
231
See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 10, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0110/2010-R (Bol.). This judgment also establishes that
constitutional interpreters have abided by IACHR jurisprudence, that is to say,
because of their expansionary influence, their rulings become directly effective in
the States parties, regardless of whether the said jurisprudence emanated from a
case in which the said States are facing charges. Cabrera García v. Mexico,
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 79 (Nov. 26, 2010).
232
For an analysis concerning the political implications of the supranational
courts, see Mary L. Volcansek, Supranational Courts in a Political Context, in LAW
ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 1
(1997).
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the inter-American context, revealing its far-reaching vocation as
protector of human rights and highlighting its progressive nature.233
The will to provide full protection for IACHR judgments
becomes patently obvious with the Constitutional Court’s
pronouncement that one of the reasons to sustain its constitutional
hierarchy at the domestic level can be explained through “the useful
effect doctrine” as applied to judgments related to human rights.234
Developed by the IACHR,235 this doctrine stipulates that the
judgments delivered upon confirmation that a human right has been
violated shall generate international responsibilities for the State
violator, thereby placing on that State inescapable and inexcusable
duties vis-à-vis the international community.236 Through this
“useful effect doctrine,” IACHR jurisprudence is fulfilled and
receives full recognition at the domestic level.237
233
In this regard, some authors point out that national courts’ cooperation
with an international tribunal can play a critical role in developing review powers
vis-à-vis the executive operating at the level of an international organization. They
also hold that these courts have undertaken collective action as a response to the
prevailing international needs. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National
Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
59, 61-62 (2009); Tom Ginsburg, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the
Evolution of International Law: A Reply to Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1021, 1021-26 (2010).
234
Rafael Bustos Gisbert, XV Proposiciones Generales para una Teoría de los
Diálogos Judiciales, 95 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 13, 39-40
(2012) (“[I]f the decisions of other courts are appropriated by a nation for
incorporation into its own constitutional rule, we can talk about comprehensive
summaries, which takes place when dialogue leads to the inclusion of external case
law on rights in the domestic case law.”).
235
See Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158, ¶ 128
(Nov. 24, 2006); Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186, ¶ 180 (Aug.
12, 2008).
236
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 14, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0406/2011-R (Bol.).
237
The recognition of IACHR jurisprudence as part of the Block of
Constitutionality is extremely important. States have usually been reluctant to
recognize the binding character of the jurisprudence established by supranational
courts, even in cases that those States themselves have been party to. It has
happened with the United States, which stated in the famous case, Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), that, in order to reject the court’s decision, “[n]othing in
the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory
nations suggests that the” judgments of an international tribunal should be given a
higher status than that enjoyed by the country’s most fundamental constitutional
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Regardless of whether Bolivia is party to a legal proceeding
before the IACHR, its Constitutional Court incorporates the
arguments of IACHR judgments into the Block of
Constitutionality.238 The Constitutional Court has pointed out that
the norms originating from international constitutional systems are
fully integrated into the Bolivian Block of Constitutionality, and thus
has endorsed the “constitutionalization” and dissemination of
axiomatic and dogmatic guarantees-based international legal
instruments.239 This is an open and comprehensive interpretation,
with the Constitutional Court offering innovative solutions in
harmony with the principle of a State that is subject to the rule of
law and seeks maximum protection of human rights. 240
Article 410.II of the Bolivian Constitution is not limited to
creating a closed catalogue of international instruments with
constitutional rank. On the contrary, it leaves it open to all
international human rights treaties already ratified or that may be
ratified by the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the future. On the
basis of this article, new types and concepts of rights never before
enumerated as such have been qualified and introduced into the
new constitutional text. In this manner, for example, Bolivian
constitutional law incorporates international human rights law, the
right to peace, international humanitarian law, the right to
integration, and other international norms designed to protect
human rights, both as a fundamental part of the national

protections. LOUIS HENKIN, SARAH H. CLEVELAND, LAURENCE R. HELFER, GERALD L.
NEUMAN & DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, HUMAN RIGHTS 944-45 (2d ed. 2009).
238
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 20, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 1250/2012 (Bol.).
239
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17, 2010, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 0980/2010-R (Bol.).
240
Héctor Masnatta, Argentina: verso una Costituzione «integrazionista», in IL
CONSTITUZIONALISMO «PARALLELO» DELLE NUOVE DEMOCRAZIE: AFRICA E AMERICA
LATINA 191 (1999). One of the international sources geographically closest to this
regulation has been included in Argentina’s Constitution of 1994. Argentina’s
constitutional debate has led to the implementation of Article 75.22 about the
hierarchical level of international treaties and concordats in general, both of which
have been granted supralegal hierarchy. However, this Article takes things further
and makes particular reference to certain international human rights instruments.
This decision is based upon the understanding that the international instruments
contained in this regulation complement the rights and guarantees recognized in
Argentina’s National Constitution. Id.
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constitutional system and as a secondary source.241 By giving special
judicial recognition to rights contained in different international
instruments but not enumerated in the Bolivian catalogue of
constitutional rights, Article 410.II prevents any right not yet
recognized by the Bolivian constitutional norm from being granted
lower status than a right already proclaimed in the constitutional
text. To this end, subsequent judicial decisions have emphasized
that the rights that are not recognized in the constitution but are
included in international treaties ratified by Bolivia shall be
considered part of constitutional norms.242 All of the above makes it
possible to develop new rights in addition to those already
enumerated in the constitution, as stipulated by the “open-clause
formula,” as well as to keep the catalogue of constitutional rights
permanently open and in constant evolution. In this connection, it
is possible to use international human rights treaties to incorporate
new rights having constitutional merits. These new rights are then
protected by the same mechanisms of protection as those specifically
designed for the rights enumerated in the constitutional text.
ii.

Implications

The recognition of international human rights law in the
constitution’s text is beyond question, as is its usefulness as a
platform to ensure full respect for its contents through constitutional
provisions. The importance attached to international law became
manifest in the debates and discussions held throughout the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, in which various
commissions stated their willingness to reach and respect
international agreements on the protection of certain rights and
undertake a number of actions to guarantee their effectiveness.
The constitution has developed a new structure of constitutional
rights distinguished by the recognition of a wide range of rights
considered to be “inviolable, universal, interdependent, indivisible
and progressive” and which, moreover, goes hand in hand with the
241
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 20, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 1250/2012, at III.2 (Bol.).
242
Código Procesal Constitucional [Constitutional Procedural Code], art.
2(II)(2) (Bol.).
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Bolivian State’s obligation to “promote, protect and respect” those
rights.243 For this reason, all Bolivian constitutional rights are
deemed to be fundamental rights244 in practice,245 taking into
account that the treatment they receive has identical connotations
both in the case of rights referred to as fundamental in the
constitutional text itself and with regard to any other kind of right
incorporated into it. 246 In this connection, the rights enunciated in
international sources can have full protection, since the
243

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.I (Bol.).

244

The fundamental character of the rights enshrined in the Constitution is
contingent on the Constituent Assembly’s perspective. Consequently,
some rights will be established as fundamental and others will not,
depending on the intended type of society. The rights are classified as
fundamental when they contribute to the Constitution’s own fundamental
nature. It is by virtue of the Constitution itself that they can become
readily available to their holder and unavailable and defendable to the
legislator.
Francisco J. Bastida, ¿Son los derechos sociales derechos fundamentales? Por una
concepción normativa de la fundamentalidad de los derechos, in ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA
CONSTITUCIÓN 1083, 1096 (2008); see also RICCARDO GUASTINI, TEORÍA E IDEOLOGÍA DE
LA INTERPRETACIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL 97-98 (Miguel Carbonell & Pedro Salazar trans.,
2008) (explaining the difference between rights created by the constitution and
those that preceded its creation).
245

When it comes to the formal conception of fundamental rights, the most
important aspect is not their content but the rank in which they are
recognized. Only those rights enshrined in constitutional or, at least,
supralegal norms can be considered as fundamental rights from the
viewpoint of their formal definition, because what makes them truly
characteristic is their resistance to the law. In other words, they bring
together all public authorities, including the democratic legislator. The
formal conception of fundamental rights can only become feasible through
inflexible constitutional provisions and mechanisms to control the
constitutionality of the laws.
Only on these terms can any right be invoked before the legislator. See DÍEZ-PICAZO,
supra note 78, at 37.
246
Rodolfo Arango, Constitucionalismo social latinoamericano y derecho a la salud,
in INTERAMERICANIZACIÓN DEL DERECHO A LA SALUD PERSPECTIVAS A LA LUZ DEL CASO
POBLETE DE LA CORTE IDH 27, 29-31 (Mariela Morales Antoniazzi & Laura Clérico
eds., 2019). An extension of fundamental rights is clearly noticeable in the Latin
American constitutions. Social and cultural rights, as any other kind of rights,
appear in the Latin American constitutions as potentially fundamental rights. Id.
The recognition of social and collective rights in another kind of society is rather of
a minimalist nature and marked by restrictions in their jurisdictional function when
it comes to providing social benefits stipulated by the law. Id.
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constitutional supremacy that international human rights treaties
enjoy over domestic legislation places the rights recognized in those
treaties on the same level as the constitutional rights enumerated in
the constitution.247 Taking into account that the harmony between
the rights consecrated in international norms and constitutional
rights is specifically stated in the constitution, as well as the fact that
both of these rights are considered to be fundamental in practice,
they can all be protected by the legal instruments designed to defend
the rights enshrined in the nation’s “organic law.”
The incorporation of rights contained in internationally
recognized instruments, customary international law, and the
judgments of the IAHCR in the Block of Constitutionality brings
with it the assumption that any law that is lower in rank, and at
variance with such rights, is in fact unconstitutional and therefore
inapplicable in the domestic legal system. 248
Through the
incorporation of the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence into the
Block of Constitutionality, not only that court’s case law but also its
methods of interpretation become part of the Bolivian domestic legal
system with constitutional status. Hence, the Bolivian domestic
system embraces an evolutionary, dynamic, pro personae,
progressive and weighted form of interpretation that gives
extraordinary impetus to its law-making power and promotes a
highly desirable and necessary cooperation and coordination
between domestic and international judges.249

247
A strong impact of international human rights law can be observed in Latin
America, where it is locally supported by the principles of constitutional law as part
of a process of nationalization of universal rights. See Arminda Balbuena, Alexéi
Julio & Gerardo Pisarello, Estado de Derecho y crisis de la soberanía en América Latina:
algunas notas entre la pesadilla y la esperanza, in CONSTITUCIONALISMO,
MUNDIALIZACIÓN Y CRISIS DEL CONCEPTO DE SOBERANÍA: ALGUNOS EFECTOS EN
AMÉRICA LATINA Y EN EUROPA 65, 68-69 (Antonio del Cabo & Gerardo Pisarello eds.,
2000).
248 See Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶¶ 145, 146,
151 (Sept. 26, 2006); Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, ¶ 223 (Feb. 24, 2011); La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 162(a)-(b)
(Nov. 29, 2006); Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135 ¶ 228 (Nov. 22, 2005);
249
Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, El Control de Convencionalidad y el Díalogo
Interjurisdiccional entre Tribunales Nacionales y Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, 19 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 221, 234 (2013).
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The constitution’s “direct applicability” clause250 is closely
related to the previously discussed “open clause” of rights. They are
both essential to the enforcement of rights springing from
international sources. In this respect, the direct applicability of
rights enshrined in international human rights treaties is totally
consistent—if not redundant—with the inclusion of international
human rights treaties in the Block of Constitutionality, since such a
hierarchy bestows immediate protection on them. Nevertheless,
much like with the rest of the constitutional rights enunciated in the
constitution, their immediate enforcement depends on the existence
of suitable means for their protection.251
As far as the guarantee of constitutional rights is concerned,252
the constitution establishes that all the rights stipulated in the
constitutional text are directly applicable and enjoy equal
guarantees for their protection.253 In this connection, it is more than
obvious that all rights receive similar fundamental status, taking
into account that their defense and protection enjoy equal rights

250
Wen-Chen Chang and Jiunn-Rong Yeh point out that recent constitutional
texts such as the Constitution of South Africa and others in Central and Eastern
Europe have incorporated chapters of rights in compliance with international
human rights law, including the introduction of one or two articles related to the
direct applicability and hierarchy of the rights contained in international
instruments, as evidenced by Article 39.1 of the Constitution of South Africa, Article
9.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, and Article 6.1 of the
Constitution of South Korea. Chang & Yeh, supra note 142, at 1168.
251
RICCARDO GUASTINI, DISTINGUIENDO: ESTUDIOS DE TEORÍA Y METATEORÍA DEL
DERECHO 185-89 (1999) (“The problem here lies in how to make a distinction
between fundamental rights and their guarantees, taking into account that the
existence of the latter is what makes it possible to distinguish the former from the
so-called ‘rights that exist only on paper.’ Given that more is needed to guarantee
a right than just its conferment, suitable means must be established with a view to
its protection, being understood that the said guarantee cannot be enunciated in the
same norm that stipulates the right. This guarantee can only be ensured by means
of a secondary norm that includes provisions designed to prevent the violation of a
right or, at any rate, seek redress for the violation in question. The content of the
written right must be precise and capable of being exercised or claimed before a
subject. Consequently, true rights are those that can be protected by the law and
exercised or claimed before a given subject, and their content entails the obligation
to practice a certain code of conduct.”).
252
See, e.g., DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 74-76 (discussing the protection of
fundamental rights against the legislator).
253
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 109 (Bol.).
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under due process of law.254 The eagerness to guarantee an effective
protection of rights, which was the Constituent Assembly’s primary
incentive, led to the establishment of equal guarantees for all rights
enshrined in the constitution, no matter what their original source
might be. Regarding the protection of rights, there is complete
equivalence between the rights that stem from international law and
those rights specifically mentioned in the constitutional text.255
The extension of the catalogue of constitutional rights comprises
both the constitutional rights enumerated in the constitutional text
and the rights recognized by international human rights treaties.
The recognition of the importance of international human rights law
in domestic legislation is evidenced by their inclusion in the Bolivian
constitutional text, not just through the mere stipulation of this
integration of rights into the Bolivian constitutional catalogue. The
guarantee of protection of these rights is also ensured by the
observance provided in the constitutional instruments, which
means that they can enjoy the maximum possible protection within
the framework of the domestic legal system.256
Along these lines, the articles of the constitution provide that
“[t]he State guarantees every person and all collectives, without
discrimination, the free and effective exercise of the rights
established in this Constitution, the laws and international human
254 See generally id. (stating the constitutional provisions of Bolivia); Código
Procesal Constitutional [Constitutional Procedural Code] (Bol.) (detailing
procedure for undertaking such actions).
255
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 128 (Bol.); Jorge
Rodríguez Zapata, Tutela interna e internacional de derechos fundamentales: ¿Cabe
recurso de amparo por la vulneración de derechos dimanantes de convenios internacionales?,
42 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 373, 373-76 (1990). It is worth
remarking that Spanish jurisprudence has drawn a different line by deciding to not
give the rights emanated from international instruments the same treatment as
those enunciated in the Spanish constitutional rule, pointing out that the
international normative must be based on the constitutional provision related to the
relevant violated right, which has a precedent in S.T.C., Dec. 14, 1982 (R.G.D., No.
13) (Spain) and, accordingly, an appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality would
be inapplicable in the case of these rights. Id.
256
Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Potentials of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties with Respect to Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, in RESERVATIONS TO
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME: CONFLICT, HARMONY
OR RECONCILIATION 183, 210 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004) (“[H]uman rights do not only
concern the relationship between States and individuals but also the relationship
among the States parties. International human rights treaties entail obligations erga
omnes.”).
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rights treaties.”257 Furthermore, this guarantee goes beyond its
simple enunciation, inasmuch as it is not just laid down in the
constitution as a desirable goal bound to be reached at some point.
Its incorporation into the Block of Constitutionality together with
the rest of the provisions discussed here involves the inclusion of
standards designed to ensure the full integration of rights derived
from international human rights instruments on equal terms with
the rights established in the constitutional text.
The Bolivian Constitution provides for a complex normative
structure that allows for a full-scale structuring of international law
in the system of domestic legal instruments. The hierarchical
position of international human rights treaties in the constitution is
settled through their inclusion in the Block of Constitutionality.
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has even gone beyond this
provision by incorporating other non-formal international human
rights instruments into the Block of Constitutionality, thus
expanding the constitutional spectrum of norms intended to protect
people’s rights and guarantees. Similarly, the problem of rights not
specifically enumerated in the constitution but recognized in
international treaties ratified by the country is solved through the
definition of the Block of Constitutionality, despite the fact that the
“open-clause” formula also could have been used to this end.
What is more, the Block of Constitutionality allows for the
incorporation into the Bolivian constitutional text not only of
international human rights treaties in their formal conception and
with a status on a level with the constitution, but also the whole set
of international norms that have emerged from those treaties’
interpretation, even if they have not been conceived as formally
binding on domestic legislation. The sole requirement to be met for
this inclusion is the assumption of an effective reinforcement of
constitutional rights based on the interpretations of the
Constitutional Court. Upon their assumption by international and
domestic courts alike, all these solutions become part of the Block of
Constitutionality and, at the same time, a potential source to create
new rights bound to be validly included in the Bolivian catalogue.258

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 14.III (Bol.).
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 20, 2012, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 1250/2012, at III.2 (Bol.).
257
258
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Since coming into force in 1978, the IACHR and its norms have
been gradually seeping into the normative fabric of the individual
legal systems of many Latin American countries. A part of the
process through which this has happened has been the development
of “conventionality control.” “Conventionality control” is the
practice by which domestic courts in states that have ratified the
IACHR assess whether a particular domestic law or administrative
procedure complies with the IACHR’s norms. In situations where
the law or procedure in question is found to be in violation of the
IACHR, the relevant court often will issue a finding to that effect,
declaring it to be in violation of existing law. The “conventionality
control” doctrine has been an effective tool for the realization of
rights, and an indispensable instrument for the slow building of an
inter-American259 jus commune,260 a Latin American common law
centered on human rights, the rule of law, and democracy.
In the case of Bolivia, we are witnessing the merging at the
domestic level of both “constitutionality control” and
“conventionality control.”261
The Bolivian constitutional text
incorporates
“conventionality
control”262
as
part
of
259

The two characteristics that Maurizio Fioravanti ascribes to European
constitutionalism, from which the supranational dimension of modernday constitutionalism has emerged, are precisely the ability to define
boundaries and guarantees vis-à-vis sovereign power on the internal level
and the capacity to participate in the development of that power through
the instrument of consensus that gives rise to the vocation of universality
and the creation of rights as prius, which shows an obvious twofold
tendency: one of resistance and one of participation.
MAURIZIO FIORAVANTI, CONSTITUCIONALISMO: EXPERIENCIAS HISTÓRICAS Y TENDENCIAS
ACTUALES 142-44 (2014).
260
Néstor Pedro Sagüés, Obligaciones Internacionales y Control de
Convencionalidad, 8 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 117, 118-19 (2010).
261
INSTITUTO DE DERECHO PARLAMENTARIO, UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE
MADRID, PAUTAS PARA UNA REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN: UN INFORME PARA EL
DEBATE 33-36 (Javier García Roca ed., 2014).
262
The conventionality control doctrine appears for the first time in the
IACHR jurisprudence in the case of Almonacid-Arellano et al v. Chile, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 154, ¶ 124 (Sept. 26, 2006), through which its main provisions are defined.
Previously, however, and based on the cases of Myrna Mack v. Guatemala, Case
10.636, Report No. 10/96, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 doc. 9
(1996) and Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
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“constitutionality control”263 through recognition of the attributes
and guarantees of convention-based rights as part of the Block of
Constitutionality.264 Upon its incorporation into “constitutionality
control,” “conventionality control” is efficiently configured as a
guarantee intended to facilitate the enforcement of current rights in
accordance with domestic and international sources.265 Unlike
“constitutionality” control, “conventionality” control also can be
exercised at the international level.
Nonetheless, there is
widespread recognition that domestic judges266 are the natural
judges of the American Convention on Human Rights, since they are
the ones in charge of forwarding and implementing the

Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114 (Sept. 7 2004), Judge Sergio Ramírez
made a conceptual approach to the said doctrine. Regarding conventionality
control, the IACHR decided in the case of Ibsen Cárdenas v. Bolivia that the parameter
governing the diffuse conventionality control doctrine is found not only in the
ACHR itself but also in its protocols and other instruments forming part of its corpus
iuris, thus clarifying the elements of the said kind of control. Ibsen Cárdenas v.
Bolivia, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
217, ¶ 202 (Sept. 1, 2010). The inter-American jurisprudence has held that the
IACHR is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention on Human Rights.
Atala Riffo v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 282, 284 (Feb. 24, 2012).
263
The IACHR also explains that domestic judicial bodies should exercise
constitutionality control in conjunction with conventionality control. Boyce et al. v.
Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, ¶ 77-80 (Nov. 20, 2007).
264
See Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, Los desafíos del control de convencionalidad
del corpus iuris interamericano para los tribunales nacionales, en especial, para los
tribunales constitucionales, 45 BOLETÍN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 1167,
1183-84, 1205-17 (2012).
265
Susana Albanese, La internacionalización del derecho constitucional y la
constitucionalización del derecho internacional, in EL CONTROL DE CONVENCIONALIDAD
13, 15 (Susana Albanese ed., 2008).
266
The IACHR emphasizes that all judges and organs involved in the
administration of justice at all levels are obliged to exercise conventionality control.
Cabrera García v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 225 (Nov. 26, 2010). See also Liakat
Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 276, ¶ 151 (Jan. 30, 2014); Expelled
Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, ¶ 311 (Aug.
28, 2014); Gudiel Álvarez et al. v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 253, ¶ 330 (Nov. 20, 2012) (stressing that
the conventionality control doctrine extends to other international human rights
treaties).
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interpretations267 on which the IACHR finds support for its own
judgments, through permanent dialogue268 and what we might
describe as “loyal cooperation.”269
b. Supraconstitutionality
The rights enumerated in international instruments take a
position within the Block of Constitutionality, a fact that, as we have
seen, has significant impact on domestic legislation. The Bolivian
Constituent Assembly, however, has gone beyond this solution by
recognizing the crucial importance of the protection of rights
regardless of their original sources, and managing to give the norms
capable of providing the best protection priority even over
constitutional norms. At this point we will discuss another set of
articles that make it possible to give preference to international
human rights law over the constitutional text, as well as what this
means for the Bolivian domestic legal system.
i.

Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I

There is no doubt that the supraconstitutional nature of the
rights contained in international treaties already accounts for the
267
In this regard, it is established that the IACHR does not impose a given
model of conventionality control. Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 276, ¶ 124 (Jan. 30, 2014).
268
Javier García Roca remarks that

the idea of a legal dialogue as judicial fiction sometimes imposed by the
law proves useful to explain how rights are developed worldwide through
a persuasive interpretation based on the written judgments of various
courts that take on a dialogue-oriented, rather than an isolationist and
nationalistic, stance as they cooperate in the context of a network of
subjects that seek solutions to problems considered to be of a similar
nature.
Javier García Roca, El diálogo entre el Tribunal de Derechos Humanos, los Tribunales
Constitucionales y otros organos jurisdiccionales en el espacio convencional europeo, in
DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS ENTRE TRIBUNALES
CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES 219, 228 (Eduardo Ferrer MacGregor & Alfonso Herrera García eds., 2013).
269
See Alcalá, supra note 249, at 233.
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highest degree of protection that any constitutional text could
provide to international human rights law. Throughout history,
national constituent assemblies all over the world have shown
reluctance to grant supraconstitutional hierarchy to international
instruments. Over time, however, Latin America has witnessed a
trend towards the creation of modern-day constitutional texts
capable of ensuring greater and more effective human rights
protection.270 The new Bolivian constitutional text addresses this
issue, creating what turns out to be a sophisticated and useful
framework for giving international human rights treaties priority
over the constitution.
It is important in this regard to pay particular attention to Article
13.IV ab initio: “International treaties and conventions ratified by
the Pluri-National Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa),
which recognize human rights and prohibit their limitation in States
of Emergency, shall prevail over internal law.”271 With this
declaration, the Bolivian State does not shy away from the express
proclamation of the supremacy of international human rights law
over domestic legislation.272 Equally significant, this statement273

See CLAUDIA ESCOBAR GARCÍA, TRANSCONSTITUCIONALISMO Y DIÁLOGO
61 (2011) (stating that Article 424 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Ecuador includes a guideline with a similar structure, which stipulates that the
Constitution and international human rights treaties ratified by the Ecuadorian
State that recognize rights that are more favorable than those enshrined in the
Constitution shall prevail over any other legal regulatory system or action by public
power and that this interpretation is left to the discretion of the Ecuadorian
constitutional interpreter).
271
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.).
272
According to Antonio Remiro Brotons, “seldom do constitutional texts
stipulate the preeminence of international treaties in cases of contradiction, since
they take the Constitution’s supremacy for granted.” Antonio Remiro Brotons,
Controles Preventivos y Reparadores de la Constitucionalidad Intrínseca de los Tratados
Internacionales, 16 REVISTA DE DERECHO POLÍTICO 109, 110 (1982-1983).
273
The Constitutional Court of Colombia, for example, has understood by
“domestic legislation” not only the normative scope of the laws but also that of the
Constitution itself, thus allowing its supranational implementation.
The
Colombian constitutional text has given the enforcement of international human
rights treaties priority over domestic provisions as far as its judicial opinions are
concerned, which has made it possible to provide superb protection of rights. See,
e.g., Corte Constitucional, October 23, 1995, Sentencia No. T-477/95, Gaceta de la
Corte Constitucional (Colom.).
270

JURÍDICO
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paves the way for the recognition of the supraconstitutional
hierarchy of international human rights treaties. 274
Judging by the above, the Constitutional Court could apply
international human rights law above its own constitutional
norms.275 This situation would be entirely in agreement with both
the spirit of the new constitutional text and the line followed by the
Constitutional Court, since it aims at providing a maximum level of
human rights protection. What is more, the Constitutional Court
has to bear in mind that the declaration of supraconstitutionality of
international human rights treaties is not uncommon in other Latin
American constitutional systems.276 Indeed, it is on the basis of
274
Judgment C-401/05 of April 14, 2005 of the Constitutional Court of
Colombia, for example, establishes that the incorporation of an instrument into the
Block of Constitutionality has its rationale in the Constitution, pointing out that it
is precisely the same procedure adopted in the case of international human rights
treaties, which, for constitutional purposes, were expressly incorporated into the
Block of Constitutionality on grounds that its norms have domestic priority. Corte
Constitucional, Apr. 14, 2005, Sentencia No. C-401/05, Gaceta de la Corte
Constitucional (Colom.); see also Brewer-Carías, supra note 120; LEÓN BASTOS, supra
note 121, at 231-33.
275
See, e.g., Sala Constitucional, Nov. 11, 1992, Sentencia No. 0343 (Costa Rica)
(noting that, despite the recognition of the constitutional hierarchy of international
human rights instruments in Costa Rica, the Constitutional Chamber in that
country had recourse to Article 48 of its Constitution to recognize not only that the
human rights instruments currently in force have a similar status as the
Constitution, but also that, as they accord people more rights or guarantees, they
are in a position of supremacy with regard to the Constitution). The Constitutional
Court has stated that its rulings cover not only the violation of constitutional rights
but also the whole universe of fundamental rights contained in international human
rights instruments ratified by the country. Sala Constitucional, Nov. 10, 1993,
Sentencia de Clarificación No. 5759 (Costa Rica). The aforementioned Costa Rican
Article was modified through Act 7128 and, therefore, it also incorporates now the
instruction to recognize fundamental rights, including those enunciated in the
relevant international instruments. Following the enactment of this legislation and
the subsequent promulgation of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction of 1989, the
international human rights treaties ratified by the country achieved supranational
status, including not only international treaties duly authorized by the Legislative
Assembly but also those yet to be authorized by it, which entails a significant
extension of the catalogue of fundamental rights. Hence, the rights emanated from
international treaties shall have the same effect, scope, and guarantees as the
fundamental rights contained in the Costa Rican Constitution, and only the way of
incorporating them into the domestic legislation will change. See LEÓN BASTOS,
supra note 121, at 231-33.
276
See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31,
1985, art. 46 (establishing in matters of human rights the principle of “preeminence”
in favor of international human rights treaties, indicating that the latter have
precedence over domestic laws).
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similar interpretations that some Latin American systems have
managed to include in their domestic legal order new rights drawn
from international law.277 Even if it is true that such interpretations
have not been free of problems,278 in almost every case these
problems are solved through the recognition of the constitutional
status of international human rights instruments.279
From the above, we can infer that the potential scope of Article
13.IV ab initio is contingent on the way in which the Constitutional
Court will interpret its content. 280 Considering that, in line with the
standards governing the interpretation of constitutional rights, the
Court has tried to make Bolivia’s domestic law as open as possible
in order to facilitate the illumination of international human rights
law, it is not preposterous to say that the Constitutional Court can

277
See, e.g., Corte de Constitucionalidad, May 27, 1997, Expediente No. 128196, Gaceta Jurisprudencial no. 44 (Guat.) (ruling on the basis of Article 45 of the
American Convention on Human Rights with the aim of protecting rights not
expressly enumerated in its constitutional text).
278
Article 4.II of the Constitution of the Brazil, for example, stipulates that its
international relations shall be governed by the prevalence of human rights.
Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 4.II (Braz.). Starting from this
premise, a supranational protection of human rights can also be inferred.
Nevertheless, in its interpretations, the Brazilian Court of Justice has been reluctant
to even grant constitutional rank to the rights emanating from international treaties.
In this respect, it has been argued that the recognition of this position is not a
determining factor for the proper fulfillment of Brazil’s international obligations,
since the most important is the interpretation of rights on the basis of international
canons. See Antonio Moreira Maués, Supralegalidad de los Tratados Internacionales de
Derechos Humanos e Interpretación Constitucional, 18 SUR-REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 217, 230-31 (2013).
279
See Pablo Luis Manili, La Recepción del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos
Humanos por el Derecho Constitucional Iberoamericano, in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE
LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 371, 381 (Ricardo Méndez Silva ed., 2002).
280
See Francisco José Eguiguren Praeli, Aplicación de los Tratados Internacionales
Sobre Derechos Humanos en la Jurisprudencia Constitucional Peruana, 9 REVISTA IUS ET
PRAXIS 157 (2003) (“It has been suggested that the fourth of the Final and Transitory
Provisions of the Peruvian Constitution of 1993, for example, might pave the way
for an interpretation conducive to the granting of constitutional status to
international human rights treaties, inasmuch as they are thus conferred a function
as a parameter or a limitation regarding the content of the rights and their
interpretation. None of this would be possible if the said norms were lower in rank
than the Constitution. It has even been said that these articles could raise the
international human rights norms to a supraconstitutional level. This interpretation
has not been literally expressed by the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal, which has
nevertheless drawn sustenance from International human rights law in order to
establish criteria and define the content and scope of these rights.”).
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deliver its judgments by granting international human rights law
supraconstitutional hierarchy.
On the other hand, Article 256.I of the constitution stipulates:
“[I]nternational treaties and instruments in matters of human rights
that have been signed and ratified, or those that have been joined by
the State, which declare rights more favorable than those contained
in the Constitution, shall have preferential application over those in
this Constitution.”281 Here, one notices a much more specific
provision about the supraconstitutional character of the norms
contained in international treaties. Although the first part of Article
13.IV of the constitution may be interpreted in a restrictive manner
by the Court, on the assumption that the application of domestic law
might be exclusively making reference to regulations having lesser
rank than the constitution,282 Article 256.I leaves no room for doubt,
explicitly stating the possibility of preeminence over the Bolivian
constitutional text.283
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 256.I. (Bol.).
The Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina concluded, in the case of
Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties grants an
International Treaty right of way in cases of conflict with any domestic law,
including the Constitution. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN]
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 7/7/1992, “Ekmekdjian, Miguel Angel c.
Sofovich, Gerardo y otros,” Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.). Later on, however, in the
Fibraca case, the Supreme Court changed the precedent and stated that the said
priority depends on its degree of compliance with the Constitution. Corte Suprema
de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 7/7/1993,
“Fibraca Constructora S.C.A. c. Comisión Técnica Mixta de Salto Grande,” Fallos
(1993-316-1669) (Arg.). For a discussion of the Court’s interpretation of the above
cases, see Néstor Pedro Sagües, Mecanismos de Incorporación de los Tratados
Internacionales Sobre Derechos Humanos, al Derecho Interno, 61 DERECHOS HUMANOS:
ÓRGANO INFORMATIVO DE LA COMISIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DEL ESTADO DE
MÉXICO 45, 46-47 (2003).
283
In contrast, this stipulation, suggesting the existence of a more favorable
universal law, has not taken hold in the practical reality of the States. Notably, each
time that the United States has ratified a major human rights treaty, it has included
a package of conditions known as “RUDs” (Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations). The intention is to decline to agree to treaty provisions to the extent
that they violate individual rights provisions of the constitution or to certain other
provisions on policy grounds. These RUDs also announce that they purport to
interpret some provisions that are undefined in the treaties and the text in general
in a manner consistent with its federal system of government and declare as well
that the terms of the international treaties are not self-executing. See BRADLEY, supra
note 195, at 36-38. For more on RUDs, see HENKIN, CLEVELAND, HELFER, NEUMAN &
ORENTLICHER., supra note 237, at 784-87. However, customary international law is
indeed directly applicable to the States. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L.
GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 605-22 (4th ed. 2011).
281
282
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While the preferential observance of human rights is always
subject to the recognition and application of domestic laws that
ensure the effective integration of those rights’ characteristics, this
rule cannot be argued as a pretext to restrict internationally
proclaimed human rights. No restriction or alteration of the rights
contained in international treaties can be allowed if that turns out to
entail an inadequate protection of human rights.284 Some legal
284
Article 23 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
stipulates that the international instruments relating human rights which have been
executed and ratified by Venezuela have a constitutional rank and prevail over
internal legislation, insofar as they contain provisions concerning the enjoyment
and exercise of such rights that are more favorable than those established by the
Constitution and the laws of the Republic and shall be immediately and directly
applied by the courts and other organs of the public power. CONSTITUTION OF THE
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA Dec. 1999, art. 23. This rule allows for the direct
application of international human rights treaties, to the point of granting them
supranational status when they provide more favorable norms, just like in the new
Bolivian constitutional text. However, the Constitutional Court of the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela has interpreted the aforementioned Article in a
clearly restrictive manner, stating that it makes reference to rights-making
instruments rather than to the judgments delivered by institutions or bodies
prescribed in international treaties. See Sala Constitucional, July 15, 2003, Judgment
No. 1942 (Venez.). It also found that the interpretation of this constitutional rule
only concerns human rights-making norms, stating that prevalence is limited to the
norms of international treaties in matters of human rights, without including the
reports and opinions issued by international bodies intended to interpret the scope
of the international instruments. Id. The court continues its interpretation saying
that the constitutional hierarchy of international treaties is related to those
standards which, once they are incorporated into the constitution, have as their sole
interpreter—with a view to their adjustment to the Venezuelan Internal
Legislation—the Venezuelan constitutional judge and, particularly, the
Constitutional Court. Id. The Venezuelan Constitutional Court has emphasized its
exclusive competence to determine which international instruments in matters of
human rights will prevail at internal level as well as which human rights not
enumerated in those international instruments have legal effect in Venezuela. Id.
The Court safeguards its competence by stipulating that these powers cannot be
diminished by objective standards contained in international human rights
instruments ratified by the country that make it possible for the States parties to
consult international bodies about their interpretation, highlighting the fact that,
should such consults be allowed, the outcome would be a form of constitutional
reform without the proper arrangements for it. Id. The competence of the
Constitutional Court would be undermined and the supranational organs would
be entrusted with such competence as to make binding interpretations. Id. At a
later date, following Sala Constitucional, Dec. 18, 2008, Judgment No. 1939 (Venez.),
this tendency was confirmed, to the extent that the judgment of the IACHR of
August 5, 2008 became non-enforceable and a denouncement was filed with the
IACHR. See Carlos Ayala Corao, La Doctrina de la “Inejecución” de las Sentencias
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scholars have argued that, despite the existence of different
provisions in other regional constitutional systems which seem to
favor the thesis of supraconstitutionality, such status has been
“diminished by a corrective and, at times, ‘denaturalizing’ kind of
jurisprudence on the part of national courts.”285 Even in the
experience of some supranational courts, there have been attempts
from a protectionist and nationalistic perspective286 to put obstacles
in the way of international rights-protective instruments,287
resulting in violations of disadvantaged groups’ rights. “For this
reason alone, democratic legitimacy should not be used as a
justification to evade international human rights protections.”288 In
this respect, and despite the extent to which the constitutional norms
are open to international human rights law, the interpretations to be
made by the Constitutional Court are of paramount importance to
ensure an effective protection of human rights. Just as certain
constitutional formulas can be used to ensure an effective openness
to international law, so too can they cause serious problems
regarding the protection of rights based on a staunch defense of

Internacionales en la Jurisprudencia Constitucional de Venezuela (1999-2009), in Diálogo
jurisprudencial en derechos humanos entre tribunales constitucionales y cortes
internacionales 503, 568 (2013).
285
Néstor Pedro Sagües, El “control de convencionalidad” en el sistema
interamericano, y sus anticipos en el ámbito de los derechos económico-sociales, in DIÁLOGO
JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y
CORTES INTERNACIONALES 993, 1003 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera
García eds., 2013).
286
A nationalistic discourse and a lack of identity are still present in the
process of European integration construction. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LA INCLUSIÓN
DEL OTRO (1999); CAS MUDDE, POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE (2007)
(discussing the impact of radical right parties on democracies in Europe); Margarita
Gómez-Reino & Iván Llamazares, The Populist Radical Right and European Integration:
A Comparative Analysis of Party-Voter Links, 36 WEST EUR. POL. 789 (2013).
287
It has also been stated that domestic judges sometimes use international
law to protect the national interests from external pressures. Eyal Benvenisti,
Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 245 (2008).
288
Javier García Roca, Humberto Nogueira Alcalá & Rafael Bustos Gisbert, La
comunicación entre ambos sistemas y las características del diálogo, in EL DIÁLOGO ENTRE
LOS SISTEMAS EUROPEO Y AMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 65, 69-70 (Javier García
Roca et al. eds., 2012).
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national sovereignty,289 leading to flagrant violations of
international law.290
International human rights law gives a high status to the
principles of favorability and pro homine as judicial standards for
courts to interpret and enforce rights so as best to favor the
individual, his freedom, and his rights.291 Favorability refers to
giving preference to the expansion of human rights. Pro homine is
the emphasis on outcomes that promote the dignity and welfare of
human beings. The Bolivian constitutional text recognizes both of
these principles by establishing the preferred application of
whatever norm is most favorable to human rights. Under this
framework, judgments based on international human rights treaties
can have supraconstitutional status,292 taking into account the
express provision in the constitution that such a judgment can
prevail even over the constitutional text itself. Accordingly, the
Constitutional Court can rely on significant support to make an
interpretation that places an international human rights treaty above
a narrower constitutional norm, as far as that treaty’s enforcement
is concerned.293
The Bolivian Constituent Assembly managed to set up a system
of mutual improvement between international human rights law
289
Kathryn Sikkink argues that sovereignty is a long way from disappearing,
since the sovereign State is still the prevailing force to protect, as well as violate,
human rights. Kathryn Sikkink, Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas:
Historical Precursors and Current Practices 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 705, 706 (1997).
290
See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 874 (1990).
291
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 20, 2011, Voto Disidente,
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 1360/2011-R (Bol.).
292
MICHEL TROPER, ENSAYOS DE TEORÍA CONSTITUCIONAL 84 (2004) (pointing
out that a provision cannot be considered supraconstitutional if it is enshrined in
the Constitution, except when it is thought to be exempt from any form of
constitutional review). Indeed, by peremptory constitutional decision, human
rights contained in international instruments are part of the Block of
Constitutionality, but they are not subject to the same constitutional review to
which the constitutional norms themselves are submitted, their scope and meaning
cannot be altered through a constitutional reform, and their content is international
law matter. Id.
293
Roca, Alcalá & Gisbert, supra note 288, at 68 (“[E]ven if they are not
expressly enunciated in the Constitution, there is an identical mandate in force.
These authors hold that the constitutional clauses open to International human
rights law are an exceptional resource of constitutional pedagogy for the
interpreters that is deemed to be very useful and convenient from many points of
view, but in no case are they unfailing.”).
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and the country’s new constitutional text. The solution suggested,
and required, for this end focuses on giving priority to the system
that is capable of providing the best possible protection for
ultimately conflicting rights, regardless of whether those rights have
their source in the domestic or the international legal system.294 This
measure turns out to be an effective solution and a guarantee of
human rights protection in a general sense, making the new Bolivian
constitutional standard an advanced legal text in line with the need
to protect human rights.295
The new Bolivian Constitution gives to international human
rights instruments sufficient hierarchy—of a potentially
supraconstitutional nature—to ensure their observance, thus
catapulting the Bolivian constitutional system into international
human rights law with a view to an effective protection of rights.
The Constitutional Court has declared itself explicitly to be in favor
of the supraconstitutional character of international human rights
treaties.296 The line that its judgments have followed starts an
interpretation in the direction of supraconstitutionality, as befits its
tendency to grant human rights the highest possible protection.

294
Bustos Gisbert, supra note 234, at 187 (”[A] dialogue requires not only
formal recognition by judicial organs but also realization that the actor involved has
something to say from the viewpoint of his/her competence about a matter that
another court is claiming for itself; therefore, the key is that both courts agree that
they each have a role to play in the relevant matter.”) The author stresses that the
degree of recognition by the other court depends on the intensity of the said
dialogue. Id.
295
Jure Vidmar, Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a
Vertical International Legal System?, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 16 (Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012) (stating that from
the preamble of the United Nations Charter itself we can infer the recognition that
all human beings share interests and values that transcend the interests of sovereign
States).
296
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 28, 2017, Declaración
Plurinacional, No. 0084/2017 (Bol.) (claiming the preferred application of Article 23
of the American Convention on Human Rights over the Bolivian Constitution,
which entailed the inapplicability of constitutional articles that reduce the number
of requirements to be elected for government positions by popular vote and
declared as unconstitutional those articles and laws containing the aforesaid
limitation, thus allowing for the possibility of indefinite reelection.) This judgment,
as controversial as it was, could be implemented to improve the scope of the rights
of vulnerable groups.
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Implications

The constituent process carried out in Bolivia laid the
foundations for the recognition and protection of basic principles of
international law. The old conceptions of sovereignty have been
forced to yield to the search for new constitutional solutions to the
problems of building human rights-protecting projects.
The expansion of expectations attached to the quest for
human rights has gradually weakened the hopes of
“jurisdictional exclusivity,” especially in view of the opening
of constitutional standards to international law, which allow
for the development of new possibilities regarding both the
defense and the consecration of human rights in various
constitutional texts.297
The constitutional hierarchy of domestic law regarding the
applicability of international human rights law remains an issue of
heated debate. Nevertheless, when it comes to international human
rights law, it is noteworthy that a number of norms have been
gradually recognized and even interpreted as having higher status,
which is conducive to a privileged status that contributes to the
solution of conflicts among competing rights or powers. The
recognition of obligations owed between States under international
law also reveals a change; previously, this law only recognized
norms to which States had explicitly consented. Nowadays,
however, many scholars and even policymakers recognize the
existence and validity of inviolable standards irrespective of State
consent, as in the case of jus cogens norms.298 In this respect, these
Antonio del Cabo, Introducción, in CONSTITUCIONALISMO, MUNDIALIZACIÓN
CONCEPTO DE SOBERANÍA: ALGUNOS EFECTOS EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EN
EUROPA 17, 19 (Antonio del Cabo & Gerardo Pisarello eds., 2000).
298 Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar, Introduction, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3 (Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012). Jus
cogens, according to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is
“accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Id. In
fact, jus cogens is frequently invoked as hierarchically preeminent by the parties to
judicial processes, but the courts have been reluctant to accept an extended
interpretation of the hierarchical prevalence of this kind of norm. Nevertheless,
297
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latter norms can be considered to have supraconstitutional status,
because they undermine the States’ sovereign capacity to choose
whether to be bound by certain fundamental international legal
obligations.299
Universal human rights treaties that recognize internationally
accepted rights have erga omnes effect.300 The obligations and rights
created by those treaties are owed to all. This is because the
importance of the rights protected through such instruments gives
rise to a legal interest in their protection, an obligation applicable to
all States.301 Not only are these norms applicable to international
legal systems, but they also engage domestic judges at the local and

there is an obvious intention to defend the superiority of these norms even over
international law. LISA YARWOOD, STATES ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HOLDING STATES ACCOUNTABLE FOR A BREACH OF JUS COGENS NORMS 67
(Routledge, 2011). Still, some also say that there is no solid evidence whatsoever of
accountability regarding the failure to fulfill the jus cogens and, therefore, it is
possible to say that in fact there is no such obligation, that there is universal State
practice contrary to that obligation, or that there is some limitation that exists in
relation to exercising the obligation. See Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations
Erga Omnes and Other Rules – The Identification of Fundamental Norms, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21 (Cristian Tomuschat
& Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006) (discussing the disagreement on the content
make up of jus cogens). It is worth pointing out that when a State makes a
reservation to an international treaty, and the reservation is in conflict with a norm
of jus cogens, the said reservation will not have effect. Ulf Linderfalk, Reservations
to Treaties and Norms of Jus Cogens—A Comment on Human Rights Committee General
Comment No24, in RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION REGIME 213, 216 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004). See generally Władysław
Czaplinski, Jus Cogens and the Law of Treaties, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 83, 87-93 (Cristian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc
Thouvenin eds., 2006) (discussing the criticism of the concept of peremptory norms
and its indetermination).
299
See Vidmar, supra note 295, at 28-29 (stating that these limitations are
construed on the respect of the customary obligations laid down in Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention).
300
Id. 293, at 23-25 (stating that the erga omnes obligations reveal the existence
of core values shared by the international community of States). Even if, according
to theory, these obligations can extend beyond jus cogens, their entire scope is still
unclear and, as they overlap with jus cogens norms, they may be seen as mechanism
to apply the said norms. It is worth pointing out that, as a rule, the erga omnes
obligations are not accepted as an expression of the normative hierarchy of
International law, as it happens in the case of jus cogens.
301
See id. at 23.
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national level.302 Domestic courts are State organs, so their
performance counts as State practice, and, consequently, these
courts become relevant to customary international law. 303 In the
absence of a centralized international law, courts at both the
domestic and regional level are playing a gradually increasing role
in the interpretation and implementation of international legal
obligations.304
It is perhaps easy to think of constitutional acceptance as being
restricted to international instruments in matters of human rightsprotection only, and any implications derived strictly therefrom.
But the Bolivian fundamental standard may yet be capable of
expressly proclaiming the supremacy of international human rights
law even over the country’s own constitutional text. From the
Constitutional Court’s practice thus far, we can infer Bolivia’s
constitutional vocation to take its constitutional system to a
maximum level of rights protection,305 irrespective of the source of
the relevant instruments of protection.306
302
See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003). The resolution of conflicting
standards in a decentralized international legal system is not an exclusive
prerogative of the international tribunals, since the domestic courts are capable of
solving these problems. In fact, Article 38.1.d of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice is held to imply that the judicial decisions are subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law, leaving this configuration open to the judgments
delivered by domestic courts. For a discussion on subsidiarity in international
human rights law, see Id.
303
See André Nollkaemper, Inside or Out: Two Types of International Legal
Pluralism, in NORMATIVE PLURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLORING GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 94, 96 (Jan Klabbers & Touko Piiparinen eds., 2013) (noting that many
legal systems deal with their international obligations by giving priority to those
values and rights of their legislation deemed to be incompatible with international
law, which sets in relief the fact that there may be a form of pluralism that would
not do justice to legitimate political and social differences between States and
communities within States).
304
See Vidmar, supra note 295, at 4.
305
This vocation fits perfectly into the proclamation of the Bolivian
Plurinational Constitutional Court, recognizing that, since the country has IACHR
Member State status, it cannot let its domestic law become an obstacle to the
fulfillment of its international obligations. Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional,
May 10, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0110/2010-R, at 11, 13 (Bol.).
306
See LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN, EL DIÁLOGO JUDICIAL: MÁXIMO DESAFÍO
DE LOS TIEMPOS JURÍDICOS MODERNOS 211-17 (2013). In this respect, it is particularly
interesting to mention that the process of internationalization in Latin America is
notable for being extremely protective of human rights. For a discussion about this
internationalization that takes shape through a humanization process, see id.
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Given that universally valid human rights instruments enjoy a
special rank within the domestic legal system, they become
translated into direct individual rights in cases in which the content
of their mandate is defined in sufficient detail, that is, in a precise,
integral, and unconditional manner.307 These rights rise above
constitutional standards once the State consents to fulfill its
obligations. The recognition of this condition in the Bolivian
Constitution merely reinforces a form of protection already
stipulated in international human rights law. Aware of this fact, the
Constituent Assembly went beyond its intentions of incorporating
constitutional provisions to govern the interpretation of Bolivian
constitutional rights in compliance with the norms contained in
different international human rights instruments. The Assembly
decided to go a step further and give strong support to international
human rights law by issuing criteria at once immovable and
impossible to be reduced to the individual interpreter’s opinion. To
this end, the Assembly laid down a system in an attempt to facilitate
the full integration of the rights recognized by international
instruments,308 and to give practical effect to international human
rights norms in Bolivia’s domestic legislation.309 The Constituent
Assembly found it necessary to further guarantee and observe
international law in its domestic legislation. It concluded that the
rights conferred upon individuals on the basis of legitimately
recognized international instruments needed to be made effective
307
See Ramón Paniagua Redondo, La recepción, publicación y rango normativo de
los tratados internacionales en el ordenamiento jurídico español, 90 Revista Jurídica de
Catalunya 921, 925 (1991).
308
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 256 (Bol.) (asserting
Bolivia will apply the rules of treaties and related international instruments it “has
signed and/or ratified, or those that have been joined by the State” when those
instruments “declare rights more favorable than those contained in the
Constitution,” and that interpretation of rights contained in the Constitution should
similarly comport with more favorable treaty norms).
309
See La ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE, INFORMES POR COMISIONES: LA
CONSTRUCCION DEL TEXTO CONSTITUCIONAL (Tomo III). The Bolivian constitutional
provisions are justified in the minutes and documents of the Constituent Assembly.
The Minority Report of Commission No. 3 of the Constituent Assembly remarks
that neither the State’s situation nor its root causes can remain aloof from the
universal principles that justify the existence the international constitutional
doctrine in its midst. Id. The actuality that the international treaties entail is thereby
recognized. Likewise, this Commission points out that instruments issued from
both the United Nations and the OAS provide for the said international recognition.
Id.
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immediately at all levels of the Bolivian legal system, in the same
manner as the rights recognized in the new constitutional text itself,
without depending on particular jurisdictional or jurisprudential
constructions.310 That is how the Assembly established that the
supremacy of international law in matters of human rights must be
on a par with the fundamental rights and values contained in the
national legislation.311
With this inclusion of norms drawn from international human
rights law, the domestic court or interpreting body must evaluate
and put into practice the principles that grant the protection of rights
a higher regulatory role. In this context, the openness afforded by
the Constitutional Court serves the country’s purpose of
guaranteeing such protection. However, it must be kept in mind
that the Constitutional Court is not the only organ expected to
implement the higher standard, for any other domestic judge or
tribunal is also empowered to choose the highest jurisdictional or
regulatory norm, as provided for in the new Bolivian constitutional
text.312
The primacy rule stipulated in Article 13.IV ab initio and Article
256.I have different implications from those of articles 13.IV in fine
and 256.II. Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I also complement the
purpose of incorporating international human rights treaties into
the Block of Constitutionality. In cases where Article 13.IV in fine
and Article 256.II apply, their interpretation is governed by
international standards. This entails an interpretation exercise in
accordance with the internationally recognized principle of
“conforming interpretation.” Nevertheless, such an exercise proves
to be impossible in situations of unsolvable contradictions. When a
contradiction cannot be settled by means of a “conforming
310
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 14.III. (Bol.) (“The
State guarantees to all people and communities, without any discrimination, the
free and effective exercise of the rights established in this Constitution, the laws and
international human rights treaties.”).
311
ANTONIO LA PÉRGOLA, PODER EXTERIOR Y ESTADO DE DERECHO 29 (1987)
(“The treaty . . . is always subordinate to the principles sanctioned in the
fundamental text; that is to say, to the inalienable and non-derogable values of the
constitutional order.”).
312
See, e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 16, 2011, Sentencia
Constitucional, No. 1109/2011-R, at 8 (Bol.) (noting various international
instruments’ provisions against curtailing the human rights contained in member
States’ laws).
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interpretation,” Article 13.IV ab initio and Article 256.I authorize
judges to give international law priority over the constitution
itself.313
One must remember that validly concluded international
treaties must undergo constitutional control successfully in
accordance with the constitution’s requirements before becoming
part of the Block of Constitutionality.314 Nevertheless, there are
occasions in which, subsequent to this process, a serious
contradiction may become apparent between the treaty in question
and the constitutional text. In such cases, the Court is obligated to
exercise what is known as a posteriori constitutional control, which
could lead to the serious consequence of the treaty being denounced
as violating the constitution. Precisely because a situation of a
posteriori constitutional control could arise, with all of the serious
risks that this entails, the judge has an obligation to harmonize the
international treaty with the constitutional text if at all possible. The
judge must search through all possible means for a way to find a
reconciliation between the constitutional text and the treaty,
including by looking at the treaty text and its underlying rationale,
in order to find a constitutional interpretation compatible with,
rather than opposed to, the treaty. If, ultimately, the treaty and the
domestic norm prove to be incompatible, then the constitutional rule
that gives primacy to international treaties prevails. 315
The main difference between Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, on
one hand, and Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I on the other, lies in
313
See BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-63 (6th
ed. 2011). In the case of the United States, even if both the Constitution and the
international treaties comprise the supreme law of the land, it has become clear that
in cases of contradictions between both norms, the high courts have chosen not to
apply international law, recognizing that the Constitution prevails over it as far as
its applicability is concerned. Id. Thus, it is held that an international treaty cannot
be validated if it is in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (upholding international treaty protecting migratory birds
because it did not “contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the
Constitution,” nor violate the Tenth Amendment); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1957) (finding, with respect to the U.S. Constitution’s Article VI, “[t]here is nothing
in this language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them
do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.”).
314
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 259 (Bol.).
315
See Pedro Sagües, supra note 282, at 49 (referring to the “increasingly
preferred rule in contemporary doctrine” that dictates, between a constitution and
a conflicting treaty, priority is given to that which “better protects the personal right
in question.”).
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their judicial consequences. While the first set of articles mandates
“conforming interpretations,” the second set might declare the norm
in the constitutional text inapplicable. It must be emphasized that,
in cases of inapplicability, we are talking about norms that are totally
conflicting, and not about norms that could be reconciled. The legal
consequence of inapplicability can only come into force in cases of
insuperable contradictions. Taking into account the seriousness of
the resulting effect, that is, a finding that the constitutional text is
inapplicable and at odds with the international treaty, the judge
always must leave the door open to the possibility of harmonization.
Now, as to the exercise of judicial oversight over
supraconstitutional rights, once their standing in the constitutional
instrument is understood, there are two possible scenarios. In the
first of them, the domestic judge is the one who could resort to
supraconstitutional norms to exercise oversight over the
constitutional norms. In the second scenario, the national laws in
disagreement with the supraconstitutional norms can be reviewed
by international judges who have been declared competent to do
so.316 The judicial outcome in domestic law would be identical in
both cases.
In line with these standards, supraconstitutionality means that
international human rights instruments enjoy a higher legal status
than the rest of the national laws, including the constitutional text,
leading to the conclusion that international human rights law can be
opposed to the constitution itself and even require the latter’s
reform.317 This is the greatest and most serious consequence that the
constitutional text may have to endure. In cases where, as a
consequence of the constitutional status given to the norms of
international human rights law, a provision in the constitutional text
may be inapplicable, the best solution to this contradiction becomes
a revision or reform of the constitutional text itself.
While in cases of contradiction nothing prevents the
constitutional norms from being modified, we must take into
316
See, e.g., Louis Favoreu, El problema de la supraconstitucionalidad en Francia y
Europa, in PROBLEMAS ACTUALES DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL: ESTUDIOS EN
HOMENAJE A JORGE CARPIZO 107, 114-15 (1994) (revisiting the Open Door case as an
example in which tension arises between two fundamental rights, and where,
without any statement on the merits, the European Court of Human Rights gave
conventional law priority over the constitutional rule).
317
See Pedro Sagües, supra note 282, at 46.
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account that those norms related to human rights demand a more
complex process of modification.318 The provisions having to do
with the basic or essential content of these norms—their intangible
part—cannot be changed. Any constitutional regulation in violation
of these norms would be inadmissible, and the norm of international
law that stands above such a regulation would offer better
protection. Thus, the necessity of limits and boundaries to national
interpretation or judicial construction, as well as the need to adapt
such limits and boundaries, on the basis of strategies provided by
comparative law, become plain to see.319
This outcome, which is a matter of great seriousness to domestic
law, proves to be an extremely important element in efforts to
protect global legal goods. The success of such a project is made
possible by the role played by domestic judges in conjunction with
international law. Taking into account the great impact that
international human rights law has made on the Bolivian
constitution, it is imperative to hold a permanent dialogue that
favors a two-way continual improvement between domestic
constitutional rights and the rights contained in the instruments of
international human rights law.320
318
See JAMES BRYCE, CONSTITUCIONES FLEXIBLES Y CONSTITUCIONES RÍGIDAS 31100 (1988) (considering it “a mistake to accuse flexible Constitutions of being
unstable, since stability is a distinctive merit claimed for them, insofar as they can
be extended or adapted according to the circumstances without detriment to its
structure and, therefore, a well-drawn rigid Constitution will confine itself to
essentials, and leave many details to be filled in subsequently by ordinary
legislation and by usage”).
319
See Favoreu, supra note 316, at 116.
320
See Bustos Gisbert, supra note 234, at 23-27

The communication between courts of law is a consequence of both the
search for solutions to similar problems occurring within identical
decision-making processes and the need to guarantee the coexistence of
dissimilar legal codes, which involves, among other measures, the actions
to achieve integration on the basis of human rights with a view to using
the judgments delivered by different judicial organs to avoid obstructions
brought forth by total inconsistency. In this context, however, it is
necessary to distinguish the kind of communication that is so typical of
the field of comparative law and takes place between high courts of justice
and the one that is sufficiently intense to compel the courts to make
decisions more in keeping with those delivered by external judicial organs.
The latter form of communication matches what constitutes a dialogue
proper.
Id.
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In these cases, “the search for consensus among courts of law
which are intent on protecting human rights but whose
interpretations contradict one another translates into a
constitutional demand, because the creation of scenarios based on
constitutional pluralism can be carried through precisely by the
constitutional norms themselves.”321 This is the reason that
constitutional dialogue is the only possible way to find suitable
solutions in a plural constitutional setting that works on various
levels—domestic, regional, and international.322
It is worth
mentioning in this regard that the articles of the Bolivian
Constitution stand out plainly as an exceptional source of
international law.323 The impact of international human rights law
on it is reinforced through the opening of unrestricted cooperation
between national and international jurisdictions, 324 which is
particularly convenient at the present time, when the supranational
321
See Miguel Poiares Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of
Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in RULING THE
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 356,
371 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009)

There is nothing fundamentally new about constitutional pluralism:
pluralism is inherent in constitutionalism because its ideals authorize, if
not promote, equally normatively valid and competing constitutional
claims. There can be no monopoly for constitutional claims, and often
competing constitutional claims are expressed by different institutions all
empowered to give meaning to the Constitution. Id. What the current
forms of constitutional pluralism have done is multiply these institutions,
notably, courts from competing jurisdictions and different sites of power,
even within a State.
Id.
322
See, e.g., Bustos Gisbert, supra note 234, at 54 (suggesting that while not
always possible, if “solutions of synthesis” are to be reached, they will be reached
through judicial dialogue).
323 See generally Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia, Las Relaciones entre el Derecho
Internacional y el Derecho Interno: El Caso de la Constitución. La Constitución Como
Fuente de Derecho Internacional, 45 REVISTA DE DERECHO P OLÍTICO 69 (1999)
(discussing constitutions as a source of rights and obligations not only for their own
State but also for other States within the international community).
324
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that there has been some friction with
international bodies. Consequently, following the complaints of Bolivia, Ecuador,
Venezuela, Colombia, and El Salvador about the severity of the precautionary
measures dictated by the IACHR, the Permanent Council of the OAS established a
Working and Reflection Group in 2011, which in May of 2013 issued a reform of the
Commission’s Rules of Procedure and in March of 2013 issued a report aiming to
strengthen the inter-American human rights system. A.G. Res. 1/13 (XLIV-E/13),
Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.P. (Mar. 22, 2013).
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and domestic constitutional courts need flexibility and resilience for
the benefit of the maximum protection of rights.325
V. CONCLUSIONS
a. The Bolivian Catalogue of Rights Inevitably Requires the Minimum
Standards of International Law
Although the new Bolivian Constitution contains an expanded
catalogue of rights, it should be kept in mind that, given the limited
resources available to the State, most of the rights and guarantees set
forth in the constitution are “orientative” or “guiding” purposes to
which the government should direct public policy. This means that
the Bolivian catalogue of rights needs to be complemented and
configured based on compliance with the minimum standards
provided by international human rights law and institutions. Even
though the configuration of such human rights responds to the need
to provide symbolic arguments for the fight against inequality and
discrimination, it is recognized that it is international law that
should serve as a guide to the legislator through its standards.
International law also establishes the ultimate legal bases that enable
claimholders to seek redress in cases of violations. In this sense, no
matter how developed rights are in the constitution, the keys to their
interpretation, especially in relation to the positive actions which the
State is obligated to carry out to enforce rights, must be found in
international norms and institutions.
The immediate consequence of all this is to emphasize the value
and importance of the inter-American human rights system. Its
main challenge has been precisely to generate the capacity to guide
the actions of its member States through common standards and
principles, both for the determination of the processes of
formulating public policy, as well as for overseeing the effective
establishment of minimum standards of mandatory compliance for
all member States. The use of international standards to give
meaning to constitutional rights is especially necessary in the case of
325
Roca, Alcalá & Gisbert, supra note 288, at 70 (noting that judicial
understanding of fundamental rights constantly changes in response to
contemporary circumstances and cultural and social norms).
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the rights of indigenous peoples, in which international human
rights law plays a leading role to build limits and amalgams between
the rights of indigenous peoples and the rest of the body of
constitutional rights. For this purpose, it is fundamental that
jurisdictional dialogues should take place at multiple levels and be
structured through relations of continuity and reciprocal effect
among different legal decision-makers, from local judges and courts
to regional and international ones.
b. When Interpreting the Constitution, the Relevant Court is Obligated
to Justify its Use of Whatever Interpretative Canon to which it
Resorts
The Bolivian Constitution contains the obligation to go beyond
the national protection barrier, to allow the interpretation of rights
based on international normative frameworks protecting human
rights. Interpretation from international sources is especially
important because of the extensive nature of the constitution’s
catalogue of rights, which is susceptible to possible collisions or
conflicts, requiring the definition of clear standards of compliance.
On the basis of Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, the constitution opens
the way to the interpretation of constitutional rights through the
norms established in ratified human rights treaties. However, the
Constitutional Court has gone beyond these provisions and has
included as an interpretative canon those norms and practices
developed by international human rights bodies, thus recognizing
that the corpus juris of international human rights law must be
understood in an integral manner. In this way, not only the rights
proclaimed by international instruments such as treaties, but also
the decisions and interpretations made by international courts, are
of special relevance in the process of expanding the
internationalization and domestic application of human rights.
Article 256.II, however, also serves as a limit, determining that
the interpretative opening to international human rights law is not
unrestricted or unconditional.
This formulation creates an
important bridge for the interpretation of rights in a pluralistic way,
since it facilitates that interpretative canon which ensures the best
protection of human rights, regardless of where the standard comes
from. In this way, on the one hand, the interpretation of
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constitutional rights is mandated in terms of international human
rights law and, on the other hand, the interpretation of international
human rights law in terms of constitutional rights is also available,
allowing for the application of that norm which gives better
protection to the rights in question.
Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II are configured as clauses to which
the Constitutional Court must make mandatory resort for the
interpretation of constitutional rights. At this point, it is important
to emphasize emphatically that the Constitutional Court invariably
must resort to these articles. These articles are not merely optional
to use; they obligate the Constitutional Court, as well as all domestic
judges, to interpret the content of constitutional rights in accordance
with the norms that integrate human rights treaties and the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution. Because of the fundamental
importance of this activity, its expression as judicially binding is
irrefutable.
Under this understanding, judges cannot ignore the legal
interpretation based on international law simply when it seems
appropriate or timely. The application and interpretation of
international law must be explicitly included in the decisions,
substantiating the specific standard or standards used for the
protection of rights. Only from its expression in a legal opinion is it
possible to establish the legitimacy of the court’s use of one standard
over another one. Therefore, although the expression in a legal
opinion of such an assessment is not a sine qua non requirement, it is
highly desirable in order to achieve a better understanding and
application of the interpretative canons, ensuring that the important
constitutionalization of these clauses has a real effect. In fact, were
the court not to resort to Articles 13.IV and 256 in its analysis or legal
opinion, this would amount to “an interpretation prejudicial to one’s
rights,” also known as an interpretatio in peius.
c. The New Bolivian Constitution is Directed Towards a Pluralistic
System of Rights
The constitution establishes a “Block of Constitutionality” that is
constructed by Article 410.II, integrating all human rights treaties
duly ratified. The article is very broad, since it does not limit itself
to stating a traditionally closed catalogue of international
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instruments. This clause, being open, is capable of including all the
human rights instruments ratified by the State.
However, the Constitutional Court has included both the
judgements of the Inter American Court of Human Rights and its
methods of interpretation, as well as some non-formal human rights
instruments. This has made it possible to incorporate new rights
from international sources into the domestic catalogue of human
rights. These new rights are incorporated with constitutional value
and, therefore, offer the same protection as those recognized
textually as constitutional rights. This brings with it an important
effect: infra-constitutional norms that are in contradiction with the
international instruments that make up the Block of
Constitutionality are themselves unconstitutional.
A very important characteristic of this framework is that, as
mentioned earlier, it facilitates the fusion, in the domestic system, of
“conventionality control” (the review of a norm to insure its
compliance with an international treaty or convention) with
“constitutionality control” (the review of a norm to insure its
compliance with the constitutional text). This fusion is an effective
tool for the realization of rights, as well as an ideal instrument for
the construction of an inter-American jus commune or regional
common law of human rights. In this process, “constitutionality
control” subsumes or includes “conventionality control” in the
domestic system, the only difference being that “conventionality
control” can also be exercised by international courts. This effect
constitutes an unquestionable requirement for constant cooperation
and loyal dialogue between national and international judges.
Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I complete the Bolivian constitutional
regulation on human rights, since they do not limit rights from
international sources to a question of hierarchy but establish that
rights from international sources may apply over the constitution
itself when they produce better protection of rights than that set
forth in the constitutional text.
The indicated relation, apart from supposing, in terms of
hierarchy, a “supraconstitutionality” in the application of rights,
implies the highest possible level of sophistication in the Bolivian
constitutional system. The system facilitates the application of
norms that offer better protection of rights regardless of the
constitutional or jurisprudential source from which they come,
whether national or international. This effect is in accordance with
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the guaranteeing will of the Bolivian constitutional text. It forms a
pluralistic scenario for the protection of rights in which the last
answer is not found in only one constitutional place, nor based only
in one constitutional rule, but instead recognizes different
constitutional spaces or “places” to find the answer under various
constitutional standards for better and more consistent protection of
rights.
The Bolivian constitutional system allows us to think also of
different solutions, according to every specific case, without fearing
that the international norm will be applied over the constitutional
norm itself. In cases in which international law is applied in
preference to the constitutional norm, the latter remains inapplicable
only in that specific case. Such case-specific application does not
necessarily affect reform of the constitutional text but brings about
a transformation derived from the conjugation of constitutional
sources from different traditions and national as well as
transnational legal systems.
These dynamics of constitutional interpretation reflect the
existence of an effective plurality embracing both international and
constitutional norms. The latter norms are no longer intended to
solve all the problems raised in a specific case but seek to do so
through a coordinated exercise of constitutional and jurisdictional
dialogue, in which both the domestic and international systems
claim the highest decision authority. There is no ultimate authority
in the Bolivian constitutional system. On the contrary, the Bolivian
Constitution recognizes the existence of a network of ultimate
authorities and, in turn, a network of ultimate standards.
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